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HOW MUSLIMS HELP: 
AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF MUSLIM VOLUNTARY ASSISTANCE FOR SYRIAN 
REFUGEES IN LOUISVILLE, KY 
Irene Levy Yates 
July 12, 2017 
This thesis examines Islamic faith-based organizations’ involvement in Syrian refugee 
resettlement in Louisville, KY with special attention to the impact of an Islamic Relief 
USA community engagement grant awarded to Kentucky Refugee Ministries in 2014. A 
description of local Muslim community support for newly arrived refugees was 
constructed via participant observation and semi-structured interviews with former and 
current resettlement agency employees, a diverse set of Muslim community volunteers, 
and refugees who participate in and/or are supported by Islamic faith-based 
organizations. Muslim communities in Louisville approach refugee resettlement in ways 
that are significantly different from both resettlement agency staff and past co-sponsors 
and volunteers. Muslim faith-based assistance is constituted through a myth of Muslim 
community history, a trust in highly personal and flexible methods of assistance, and a 
series of obligations based on community belongings. Resettlement agencies should 































































 The Islamic center that I’m visiting today used to be a church. There are little 
hints in the architecture – the roof over what is now the prayer hall comes to a point that 
is reminiscent of a steeple and the prayer mat-patterned rug is installed at an odd angle to 
orient worshippers toward Mecca. Today, there are chairs on top of the rug oriented 
towards a table where two representatives from the local chapter of the ACLU (American 
Civil Liberties Union) are sitting. A microphone weaves back and forth between the 
sisters on the right and the brothers on the left.1 They ask: What will happen now that the 
travel ban is being challenged? Is it safe for me to leave the country? Will my daughter-
in-law be able to travel from Tunisia? What will happen to refugees already in the 
country? At the end, one sister takes the microphone and begins a passionate speech. She 
says she went to Americana Community Center, a nonprofit organization that serves 
refugees and immigrants in Louisville’s South End, to volunteer recently. “There are so 
many volunteers, but none of us,” she told the crowd, challenging them to take action and 
support their fellow immigrants and refugees. 
Since 2014, when Kentucky Refugee Ministries (KRM), a refugee resettlement 
agency in Louisville, KY, received a one-year community engagement grant from 
                                                          




Islamic Relief USA (IRUSA), an international faith-based aid organization, Muslim 
groups in Louisville have been increasingly active supporters of refugee resettlement. 
Prior to the grant and the active attempts to involve mosques and Islamic centers in 
refugee co-sponsorship that came with it, Muslim FBOs (faith-based organizations) had 
not provided significant aid to refugee resettlement. This new engagement has had a 
particularly robust impact on Syrian refugees, who started to arrive in Louisville in 
February 2014. The developing relationship between Muslim FBOs and KRM has since 
faced many challenges and achieved many successes. Muslim communities in Louisville 
approach refugee resettlement in ways that are significantly different from both 
resettlement agency staff and past church co-sponsors and volunteers. These differences 
are rooted in distinct narratives of migration history, organizational patterns within 
religious communities, and increasing entanglement between charitable work for refugees 
and the emergence of new solidarities among Muslim communities. 
The “Muslim community” that KRM seeks to engage with is not one unified 
whole, but a diverse and segmented collection of groups that identify collectively in 
certain contexts. In a fascinating twist, charitable support for refugees has triggered the 
formation of certain communal linkages that were not previously present. Using 
ethnographic methods, this study examines the solidarities and tensions between 
professional staff and Muslim community volunteers and among sectors of an emerging 
Muslim community that developed during and after KRM’s Islamic Relief community 
engagement grant. It identifies the methods and motivations by which Muslim volunteer 
groups choose to assist Syrian refugees. It also seeks to explore how refugee resettlement 
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agencies in Louisville can best work with Muslim groups for mutual advantage and 
create a strong, lasting relationship. 
 In line with current trends in social sciences literature, this analysis must consider 
the local impacts of humanitarian and faith-based models of aid, especially since both 
Muslim FBOs and KRM are faith-permeated, if to different extents. It also expands 
scholarship on the impacts of local religious organizing on the process of refugee 
integration by including populations that have been underrepresented in previous studies 
and exploring new developments in their community involvement. The following 
literature review describes the academic works that this study builds on in more detail. 
Next, the background section contextualizes current trends by exploring the history of 
Islamic charity, particularly since the rise of Islamist politics in the 1980s, the changing 
role of the mosque in the US, religious engagement in the US refugee resettlement 
program, and Louisville as a context for Muslim migration and refugee resettlement. This 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the data collection methods used in this study. 
Chapter II: “Refugee Experiences in Narration,” explores how narratives about past 
majority-Muslim refugee populations in Louisville shape Muslim volunteers’ responses 
to and expectations for Syrian refugee resettlement. Chapter III: “Material Assistance and 
Resettlement Agency Collaboration,” is a detailed discussion of the period immediately 
before, during, and after the IRUSA grant and the ways in which contrasting approaches 
to refugee aid contributed to tensions between KRM and Muslim volunteer groups. 
Chapter IV: “Emerging Communities and Voluntary Assistance”, examines how faith-
based charity has created unlikely solidarities across class, national, and ethnic divisions 
in response to international, national, and local pressures. Finally, the conclusion reflects 
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on the distinctive characteristics of Muslim voluntary aid in Louisville and makes 
recommendation for future collaboration with Muslim FBOs.   
 
Literature Review 
An inquiry on the involvement of Muslim groups in refugee resettlement must 
engage with developing understandings of the connections between humanitarianism, 
faith, and refugee integration. Neoliberal patterns of privatization increasingly de-fund, 
diminish, or eliminate governmental social services, leaving a vacuum that NGOs, many 
of which are faith-based, are filling. Concomitantly, a growing body of social science 
literature addresses the role of faith-based organizations (FBOs) and how they differ from 
or resemble transnational organizations operating on humanitarian principles such as 
Médecins Sans Frontières, the Red Cross, and the various United Nations aid agencies 
and programs. Recent works take on what FBO involvement means for humanitarian 
neutrality and what advantages they might have in projects to aid displaced persons. 
Evidence from a variety of studies indicates that FBOs can facilitate local integration in 
ways that secular NGOs find difficult and links refugee participation in a religious 
community to more positive social and economic integration outcomes. Religious groups 
are often at the center of emergent ethnic or national communities. Although some 
accounts suggest that involvement in mosques and Islamic centers does not lead to 
positive community integration, these accounts arbitrarily and erroneously exclude 
Muslims from the bounds of “host community.” Muslim volunteer groups in Louisville, 
in line with evidence from previous studies of immigrant religious communities, play an 
important part in refugee adaptation and community building. 
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Anthropology, with its long disciplinary history of interest in the links between 
reciprocity, altruism, and power in human interactions, and its tradition of scholarship 
grounded in fieldwork in the Global South, is well-placed to consider the social 
implications of charity in the contemporary world. Marcel Mauss’s essay The Gift 
(1990[1950]), perhaps the most foundational work on gift-giving, altruism (or lack of), 
and reciprocity in anthropology, established the idea that gifts create social bonds and 
obligations that can create or reinforce social structures. Mauss, his contemporaries, and 
many of his academic successors, were interested in the study of non-Western societies as 
bounded entities, often ignoring the impacts of, or in active collaboration with, colonial 
powers. 
Over the course of the 20th century, reflections on the persistent impact of 
colonialism and emerging modern global economic systems became increasingly central 
to anthropological inquiry and theory. Since the 1980s, when structural adjustment plans 
introduced neoliberal economic policies to the Global South on a massive scale, the study 
of NGOs that have stepped up to fill the gaps left by decreased government funding for 
public services and social welfare has become widespread (Fisher 1997; Ticktin 2014). 
Specifically, anthropologists have devoted a great deal of study to describing the global 
ethos of humanitarianism and its implications for the relationship between aid providers 
and aid recipients, especially in responses to disaster, conflict, and displacement (Fassin 
2012[2010]; Redfield 2013; Ticktin 2014; Malkki 2015). Their work describes 
humanitarianism as an ethical position characterized by a belief in the universal value of 
humanity and a preoccupation with the alleviation of suffering. It is associated with 
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nongovernmental organizations, but has wide-reaching influence in government and the 
private sector (Fassin 2012[2010]). 
Within this anthropological endeavor, a sub-field of researchers are now taking an 
interest in faith-based aid as a way to understand how local meanings and forms of aid 
intersect and meld with the universalizing, secular philosophy of humanitarianism 
(Bornstein 2009; Hefferan and Fogarty 2010; Benthall 2011). While humanitarianism is 
understood to be a very new phenomenon, often associated with contemporary 
institutionalized and professionalized civil society, charity is an older system of altruism 
with strong religious connotations (Bornstein 2009; Fassin 2012[2010]). Erica Bornstein 
(2009) argues that the shift from charity to philanthropy in the modern sense is an attempt 
to turn from altruism rooted in charitable feeling and a religious compassion for the poor 
to an economically rational model concerned with quantifiable outcomes. While charity 
and humanitarianism both involve a strong desire to alleviate suffering, humanitarianism 
is more strongly linked to the governance of altruism in the form of defining proper 
humanitarian objects and demanding accountability to donors. 
Although modern humanitarianism has strong historical links to Christian 
missionary activities during the colonial era, secular humanitarians often associate faith 
permeation with charity, usually understood as giving momentary reprieve in the form of 
gifts, services, or hand-outs as opposed to long-term presence and community 
collaboration. Reflecting on the work of Medicins Sans Frontieres, Peter Redfield writes, 
“Charity offers only minor ameliorations, not justice” (2013, 243). Charity, from this 
perspective, is the provision of things that responds to current conditions, not actions that 
address root causes and systematic problems. Charitable work motivated by religious 
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compassion is therefore often relegated to what Liisa Malkki (2015) would call the status 
of “mere” – sentimental, domestic, trivial – in the shadow of the modern transnational 
humanitarian system, without the recognition that many of the actions that constitute 
humanitarian aid are part of that same category. Even within strictly secular NGO 
settings, Malkki asserts, staff members are often motivated by the same emotional or 
religious affect that these organizations distain. Despite the distance that transnational 
NGOs try to define between mere charity and the work that they do, there is often little 
substantial difference between the aid that they provide and the aid provided by faith-
based charities beyond their institutionally recognized inspiration for giving. 
In the US, President George W Bush popularized the term FBO as part of his 
effort to outsource more social services projects to religious organizations by allowing 
congregations to apply for government contracts directly, but faith-based NGOs existed 
long before the term did (Adkins et al. 2010, 4; Ferris 2010, 607). Gerard Clarke and 
Michael Jennings define an FBO as “any organization that derives inspiration from and 
guidance for its activities from the teachings and principles of faith or from a particular 
interpretation or school of thought within a faith” (2008, 6). This definition is extremely 
popular in development literature and many typologies of FBOs use it as a starting point. 
It is also extremely broad, which can be an advantage and a disadvantage in that, while it 
is more descriptive of this diverse category, it can be used to lump together organizations 
like lobbying groups and churches that may have very different purposes. 
Adkins et al. (2010) presents an alternate typology which not only recognizes the 
diversity within the category FBO, but places organization on a spectrum based on the 
extent to which faith permeates mission statements, project goals, and philosophies 
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toward community engagement. At one end of the spectrum, faith-permeated 
organizations include mandatory faith content in their programs and employee leadership, 
staff, and volunteers of a particular religious orientation. On the other end, secular 
organizations actively avoid faith-based content in their programs and require no faith 
commitment from their staff. The spectrum perspective is very useful as the role of faith 
in aid work seems to be in constant flux and negotiation over time, within different 
spaces, and on different scales. 
The level of faith permeation that can be considered acceptable and professional 
by international humanitarian standards is a point of significant deliberation. Most 
scholars and aid professionals, recalling the problematic linkage between 19th century 
missionary projects, colonial regimes, and early humanitarianism in the Global South, 
agree that proselytizing as a part of any aid program is coercive and unethical. Many go 
one step further, concluding that any level of faith permeation at the programmatic level 
risks violating the humanitarian values of neutrality and impartiality. From this 
perspective, proper, professional humanitarianism is secular. 
This is not an unreasonable position, as FBOs’ past and present ethical failures are 
well documented in the literature on aid for displaced persons both in camps and during 
third country resettlement. Lynellyn Long (1993) writes that, despite the Thai 
government’s commitment to expel any organizations that proselytized among the 
Hmong in Ban Vinai refugee camp, religious activities to encourage conversion were not 
unknown and groups accused of proselytizing and ejected from the camp often found 
their way back in at a later date. Protestant organizations providing medical aid were also 
intolerant of the Hmong’s shamanic medicine, which they associated with “heathenism” 
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and “devil worship” (Long 1993, 127). Nancy Smith-Hefner (1994) reports that the 
Khmer Christian minority, a result of missionary efforts in refugee camps, established 
patron-client relationships with church leaders to receive additional aid upon arrival in 
the US. Even Buddhist Khmer took advantage of these benefits, attending church services 
for periods of time when they needed assistance. Paul Kenny and Kate Lockwood-Kenny 
(2011) identified a similar pattern in the Karen refugee community, in which churches 
provided the necessary aid that resettlement agencies were unable to give due to funding 
shortfalls. This encouraged even non-Christians to attend churches and, in at least one 
case, convert. This case study demonstrates that even in cases in which direct coercion to 
convert is not present, the material advantages of affiliating oneself with a religious 
community when facing adverse conditions can make refugees feel that they must 
convert whether or not that was aid workers’ intention. A strictly secular approach to aid 
seems reasonable in this light. 
The advantages of faith-based aid have often been overemphasized or 
misidentified. Proponents of the “cultural proximity” hypothesis, the proposition that aid 
workers who share the same faith as their clients will find it easier to provide appropriate 
assistance, may oversimplify the realities of field-based humanitarian projects (Palmer 
2011).  Religious similarities between clients and service providers may also add an 
unwanted element of proximity in cases of sectarian conflict that can prove dangerous for 
aid workers and make trust difficult to establish (De Coudier 2009). Additionally, Bruno 
De Coudier suggests that while “Religion and religiously inspired solidarity can enhance 
and solidify trust and trustworthiness,” empowering faith networks can have the 
inadvertent effect of empowering local elites, who may co-opt projects to solidify their 
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control in a community (ibid, 619). Considering these considerable misapprehensions and 
disadvantages, why might some experts recommend partnering with FBOs? 
Some scholars have challenged the frame of secular neutrality, arguing that 
secularism is itself a system of beliefs and practices, not a neutral middle ground (Ager 
and Ager 2011; Ferris 2011; Peterson 2012). Alastair and Joey Ager (2011) argue that 
functional secularism in humanitarian work fails to uphold the principle of neutrality 
because it enforces an artificial separation between humanitarian and faith discourse and 
privileges secular models. Thus, in a sense, it becomes “not so much a system for 
managing a diversity of beliefs as it is a mechanism of promoting specific ones” (ibid, 
462). Lisa Malkki makes a similar observation, writing “an unblinking, absolute 
commitment to neutrality (as to universality) involves its own kind of zealotry” (2015, 
197). In line with popular critiques of developmentalism, Ager and Ager see this trend 
toward venerating liberal materialist constructions of proper humanitarian behavior as a 
way of excluding alternative worldviews, especially those originating in the Global South 
(2011, 464). In the field, FBOs are “expected to reproduce discourses and practices of 
development and humanitarian aid” (Peterson 2012, 137). Any challenge of the status 
quo may be seen as unprofessional. 
Pressure to conform to international standards of secular humanitarian neutrality 
may nullify many of the well-documented advantages associated with FBOs (Ager and 
Ager 2011; Palmer 2011). FBOs can harness existing faith-based social networks to 
strengthen services for displaced persons. People often seek refuge in places of worship 
where religious leaders may provide initial support and protection (Clarke 2010; UNHCR 
2014). After flight, respected religious leaders can be ideal partners when attempting to 
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provide support in communities where aid workers may be distrusted and aid 
organizations with similar religious affiliations to displaced persons are often better able 
to establish trust and assess material and spiritual needs (De Coudier 2009; Clarke 2010). 
When voluntary return is possible, religious organizations are invaluable partners in 
peace-building initiatives and the process of rebuilding communities (Kirmani and Khan 
2008; Knapp et al. 2013; Mahony 2014). During and after third-country resettlement, 
religious organizations provide significant material aid and social capital to refugees 
(Smith-Hefner 1994; Allen 2010; Bauer and Chivakos 2010; Eby et al. 2011; Kenny and 
Lockwood-Kenny 2011). A recent study of best practices for approaching psychosocial 
challenges among a diverse group of refugees in Jordan supports incorporating 
discussions of faith into existing programs (Zoma 2014, 45-47). In short, there is an 
overwhelming amount of evidence that, despite the previously discussed neutrality issues, 
there are significant advantages to working with FBOs during every phase of refugee 
protection work.  
Linking these conversations about the basis of proper, professional aid to 
conversations about immigrant and refugee integration and adaptation can complicate and 
expand our current understandings of “host community". The widely agreed upon 
ultimate goal of resettlement is legal, economic, and social/cultural integration; this 
makes integration key to two of UNHCR’s three main “durable solutions” (repatriation, 
local integration, and resettlement). According to UNHCR, “the integration of resettled 
refugees occurs at a highly localised level in the communities, workplaces and 
institutions of the receiving society,” including, they specify, faith-based organizations 
and ethno-cultural groups (2002, 218). In policy documents, there are constant references 
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to the “two-way” processes of integration with the final goal of “a socially cohesive and 
harmonious society” created through community engagement (ibid, 215). This simple and 
optimistically articulated goal belies the messy complexities of human social organization 
as well as the significant discussion within the academy as to what the social process of 
integration looks like. 
Psychologist John Berry’s (1997) model of acculturation is currently one of the 
more popular interpretations of immigrant and refugee social experience and is a good 
starting point because its definition of integration shares many similarities with the one 
utilized by UNHCR. He identifies four outcomes of acculturation, which he defines as 
the interactions between groups or individuals that identify themselves as culturally 
distinct, often involving a difference of power that makes one dominant or hegemonic. 
Integration, which involves the maintenance of some form of cultural integrity while 
adopting or adapting to new practices and values, is linked to the best outcomes in terms 
of sociocultural and psychological adaptation, while assimilation, separation, and 
marginalization involve a refusal to adopt “the value of cultural diversity” on the part of 
one party and/or structural exclusion on a societal level, leading to poor adaptation. 
Berry’s model identifies a tension between cultural maintenance and contact and 
participation in other cultural groups that must be balanced to achieve integration. 
Other scholars have made similar observations, identifying ways in which 
organizing around ethnicity, religion, or another identity group can promote either 
cultural maintenance or contact and participation (not always using Berry’s terms). Most 
of this work is grounded in studies of immigrants, not refugees. Based on historical case 
studies from 20th century Jewish, Catholic, and Protestant immigrant groups, Charles 
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Hirschman concludes that “the centrality of religion to immigrant communities can be 
summarized as the search for refuge, respectability, and resources” (2004, 1228). He 
stresses the socioeconomic resources that churches and temples provide as well as the 
ways in which they may become ethnoreligious oases from the stresses of an unfamiliar 
land. In his work on religious groups in Portland, Ryan Allen (2009) discusses the 
important roles that religious organizations can play in bonding and bridging between 
immigrant communities and non-immigrant locals as well as within national communities 
riven by ethnic or clan divisions. His study included a multicultural church attended by 
both Sudanese refugees and non-refugee locals and a nationally (but not ethnically) 
homogenous Somali mosque. He observed that, in the mosque, clan tensions are set aside 
and worshipers enact both Somali and Muslim belonging, bonding them at least 
temporarily into a cohesive community. 
According to sociologists Alejandro Portes and Ruben Rumbaut (2014), ethnic 
solidarity and resilience are key adaptation mechanisms that allow some immigrant and 
refugee groups to persist and thrive. These bonds are not ahistorical imitations of 
preexisting social networks brought from their countries of origin, but “a distinct 
emergent product” forged from shared histories and migration experiences. They note 
that these bonds often link individuals or groups that would not have interacted or 
thought of themselves as sharing a common identity previously, but are unified by 
common experiences in countries of migration. In other words, cultural maintenance does 
not necessarily mean social or cultural replication as much as the maintenance of some 
form of identity or practice that is distinct from the dominant group. Indeed, many 
scholars have theorized the ways in which such solidarities in the U.S. are influenced by 
14
 
dominant forms of social stratification, such as race. Anthropologist Aihwa Ong (1996) 
claims that the intersection of racial and cultural hierarchies in the U.S. with class leads 
to ideological “whitening” or “blackening” of non-white immigrant groups. Essentially, 
immigrants with less potential for producing capital are marginalized in similar ways to 
African Americans while upper class immigrants enjoy some of the privileges of 
whiteness. In this way, immigrants become incorporated into dominant hierarchies 
without challenging them to such an extent that they collapse. 
Charity, as something that is internal to and, in some cases, essential to the 
constitution of society, could play an important role in community-building processes in 
a post-resettlement context. Anthony Oliver-Smith (2005) argues that, in the wake of 
disaster, the successful reconstitution of community must involve material and social 
components that are dialectically linked. This involves, in his view, creation of 
appropriate housing and the provision of economic resources to minimize social tensions 
and allow displaced persons to develop structures of mutual support. However, he 
dismisses similarities between the instances that he is discussing in which whole 
settlements are displaced and attempt to recreate a community in exile and resettlement 
of “individuals or families in totally new environments into which they must be 
assimilated” (ibid, 65). He need not limit his analysis in such a way; as Lisa Malkki 
(1992) demonstrates, refugee identity and community formation are fluid processes that 
incorporate shared histories and experiences for material and/or social purposes whether 
or not populations are resettled as communities or in small, diffuse groups, as in the case 
of the US refugee resettlement program. We can hypothesize, then, that resettlement and 
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building community in Kentucky might also require dialectically linked material and 
social components and that charity, as a material and social act, might play a part in this.  
Immigrant assimilation and acculturation have become particularly contentious in 
the case of Muslims due to the current popularity of Islamophobic rhetoric, the “Clash of 
Civilizations” narrative, and a new increase in xenophobic nativism. Concerns that 
foreign, often Muslim, refugees will fail to integrate socially and economically and will 
become a burden on the US welfare system are largely absent from the academy, but are 
still influential in US politics and popular anti-refugee rhetoric. In her ethnography of 
Somali Bantu refugee resettlement in Lewiston, Maine, Catherine Besteman (2016) 
chronicles the conflict between refugee communities and their helpers, who imagine an 
integration process involving mutual transformation, and assimilationists, who narrate a 
past in which previous immigrants unconditionally shed their language and culture and 
adapted with no government assistance. She writes, “Integration, for the helpers and 
immigrants alike, is about feeling safe and taking care of each other, not about neoliberal 
conceptions of personal responsibility or conformity to mainstream American norms and 
values” (Besteman 2016, 287). Opponents of Somali Bantu resettlement, on the other 
hand, criticize black, Muslim Somalis as outsiders, undeserving of aid in contrast to 
white, unemployed locals (ibid). Why should their tax dollars, they ask, be paid to people 
who are outsiders to their community and their country? 
The current form of the refugee resettlement program, as many scholars have 
pointed out, is a product of 1980s welfare reform aimed at closely governing welfare 
recipients and removing as many people as possible from government assistance (Smith 
2013; Koyama 2014; Besteman 2016). This lives on in the mandate for economic self-
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sufficiency in 90 days, a period that most agree is insufficient. In the rush to remove 
refugees from public assistance programs, already marginalized refugees continue to be 
marginalized and subordinated in the workplace due to a lack of training and support. 
Religious organizations, representing alternative organizing principles and values, could 
play a part in advocating for better aid and mediating conflicts with resettlement agencies 
when clients believe that their autonomy is being unfairly compromised. Such action has 
been observed in Hartford, CT, where Muslim FBOs helped to organize a response to 
deficient housing provisions and support mosque members after they are no longer 
eligible for government aid (Bauer and Chivakos 2010). 
Current scholarship has little to say about Muslim FBOs’ role in encouraging 
(using Berry’s terminology) “contact and participation.” In fact, several case studies 
claim that while mosques, especially ethnic mosques, play an important part in 
communities’ cultural maintenance or the creation of ethnic solidarities, they may be an 
impediment to integration with the larger local community (Allen 2009; Bauer and 
Chivakos 2010). How accurate is this conclusion? Although they admit that widespread 
anti-Muslim discrimination creates an adversarial environment for those immigrants and 
refugees who organize around Islam, Portes and Rumbaut found no evidence based on a 
variety of data sources that mosque attendance creates barriers to integration (2014, 341-
345). Even if one argues that the barrier to integration is the creation of ethnoreligious 
mosques, data on ethnic organizing in a variety of American immigrant communities 
suggests that immigrants who have a strong sense of ethnic pride and are involved in 
transnational politics naturalize at a high rate and show promising markers of economic 
and social integration (2014, 212-213). 
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Churches and non-Muslim volunteers working with Muslim refugees are 
recognized in these same case studies for their ability to bridge the gap between refugee 
and local communities (Allen 2009; Bauer and Chivakos 2010). Eby et al. (2011) 
challenges the Christian benefactor/Muslim beneficiary trope by talking about the 
benefits of refugee co-sponsorship with faith communities and encouraging engaging 
with a variety of religious groups, yet all the examples of successful co-sponsorship in 
the article are about churches. A larger body of literature about Christian and Jewish 
benefactors is to be expected considering the long history of Catholic, Protestant, and 
Jewish involvement in US refugee resettlement and the relatively short history of Muslim 
FBOs in most US cities. However, this small scope of studies of mosques leads to some 
clear weaknesses. Not all mosques are ethnoreligious centers; the many multicultural 
mosques present in the US that are attended by longtime residents make few appearances 
in the current literature. When taking these centers into account and recognizing the 
ethnoreligious churches also exist, greater similarities between mosques and churches 
might be expected in terms of supporting both cultural maintenance and contact and 
participation. 
A more nuanced analysis of Muslim communities in the US shows that Muslim 
FBOs are not non-native, separate from, or counter to the dominant cultural group by 
default. Documented debates within mosques and literature from Muslim intellectuals 
reveal communities grappling with questions of integration. How much should Muslim 
immigrants accommodate Western lifestyles? To what extent can or should religion 
change? What is the function of a mosque? While these conversations have received 
more attention in the European context, they are still relevant in US immigrant 
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populations. As early as 1987, a study of Muslim immigrants in the US concluded that, 
while many welcomed assimilation, some felt that becoming more American might 
compromise Islamic values (Haddad and Lummis 1987, 171). Many public intellectuals 
have stepped up to address these concerns, calling for a place for Islam in American 
religious pluralism and exploring what an American or Western Islam should look like 
(Haddad 2011). Influential Swiss philosopher Tariq Ramadan, for example, proposes a 
complete reevaluation of Islamic law and religious interpretation in a modern Western 
context. He writes, “a believing consciousness must live within his own time, at the heart 
of his society… and put his energy into this constant dialectical movement between the 
essential principles mined by Revelation and actual circumstances” (Ramadan 
2011[2004], 71-72). He argues that, while there are essential Islamic values that must be 
preserved, Muslims must integrate new realities of life in the West into their religious 
practice. Intellectuals like Ramadan imagine an integration process in which Muslim 
immigrants assimilate in some ways without abandoning essential parts of their religious 
heritage. 
Researchers and aid workers are increasingly recognizing that the overlapping 
nature of displacement leads to integration processes involving not just a displaced 
community and a local community, but groups that Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh calls 
“refugee-hosts” (2016, 26). These are refugees who have found themselves in a 
protracted state of displacement and share the same spaces and resources as newer 
arrivals. While they cannot be considered fully “integrated”, they constitute a part of the 
host community. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh cites the solidarities and tensions between urban 
communities of Palestinian, Iraqi, and Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Might we identify 
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refugee-hosts in the U.S.? With an over fifty-year history of government-sponsored 
refugee resettlement, it would be surprising to not observe previous displaced populations 
playing key roles in refugee integration. Taking this a step further, it is reasonable to 
predict that one might observe a larger category of immigrant-hosts – populations with 
migration histories that distinguish them from dominant native groups. The recognition 
that host communities are diverse groups of people with overlapping migration histories 
challenges essentialized understandings of being “local”. Religious, ethnic, racial, and 
national plurality is the rule rather than the exception when we consider American host 
communities. The omission of minority groups reflects a possibly damaging 
disempowerment of refugee and immigrant groups in their own process of adapting to 
and joining the local community. 
The current literature highlights ethical debates around the role of religion in 
humanitarian aid and immigrant and refugee integration. While it is clear that FBOs play 
an important part in the growing global nonprofit sector, scholars debate whether 
organizations that are inspired by religious calls to charity can be neutral enough to 
provide services without overt or implied coercion. Evidence suggests, however, that 
FBOs have significant advantages in working with client populations for whom faith is a 
more familiar organizational and ethical system than humanitarianism. Current studies of 
refugee and immigrant integration suggest that religious engagement on the part of 
immigrants can promote integration through the creation of ethnic solidarities within 
ethnoreligious communities and religious solidarities between newcomers and locals. 
Although some scholars have hypothesized that Islamophobia in the US might limit the 
utility of mosque involvement for promoting local community integration, there is not yet 
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any evidence to suggest that Muslim religious engagement will be less helpful for 
integration outcomes than engagement in other religious groups. Muslim FBO 
involvement in aid provision at the local level has been minimally studied, but studies of 
Christian and Jewish FBOs’ work in US refugee resettlement suggest that Muslim FBOs 
could enhance local integration through their work. 
 
Background 
 Setting the stage for a discussion of Muslim charity (in Arabic, al-‘amāl al-
khayriyya, literally “good works”) as it occurs in one American city requires a wide 
breadth of historical background, which is organized here starting at the global level and 
ending at the local level. This section begins with a very brief discussion of charity as it 
has been practiced in Muslim faith traditions across time and space with some focus on 
the forms utilized within the Ottoman Empire. This is followed by a description of the 
late 20th century rise of international Muslim FBOs and increasing Muslim immigrant 
organizing during the same period. Next is a summary of the U.S. refugee program’s 
faith-based history and recent program goals for religious community engagement. 
Finally, a discussion of Louisville’s particular migration and resettlement history ends 
with some comments on how current political debates regarding migration and security 
are impacting Louisville’s Muslim and refugee communities. 
 Charitable work has a long history in Muslim faith traditions. Various charitable 
contributions, such as zakat, a pillar of Islam, and ṣadaqa, a voluntary form of charity, 
are incumbent upon all who can afford to give. There is also a tradition within Islamic 
societies of donating money or land to a waqf, a kind of charitable endowment that uses 
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proceeds to distribute food to the poor and fund public service and building projects. 
Anonymous charitable contributions are generally preferred based on Qur’anic advice to 
give in secret and give all glory to God, but, historically, rulers and nobles made massive 
public contributions on special occasions. For example, Ottoman leaders would sponsor 
large public feasts to celebrate weddings and births, citing these as part of their Muslim 
duty. Although patterns of giving and receiving varied significantly based on the social 
context, focus has generally been on projects that provide subsistence and relief, not 
social mobility. Historian Amy Singer (2008) frames the history of charitable giving in 
the Muslim world as one of reciprocal acts that created particular rights and 
responsibilities and maintained power structures. The right to aid and the type and 
amount of aid given was contingent on expected social standing; for example, a formerly 
wealthy individual could be particularly entitled to aid and an orphan girl’s condition 
could be remedied by providing a dowry (Singer 2008, 159; 166). 
In the 19th century, the era of the Ottoman Tanzimat Reforms2, the central 
government took control of the large and powerful Ottoman waqfs so that they might use 
their revenue to implement modernization projects. European investors had long 
complained that the waqf system tied up too much land that they might buy in trusts and 
the Ottoman central government had come to resent the fact that waqfs could not be taxed 
(ibid, 187). Western European ideas about managing pauper populations in institutional 
settings were also adopted during this era in many parts of the Middle East and South 
Asia. Philanthropic associations based on the Western model emerged, some of which 
                                                          
2 A series of government reforms and infrastructure projects aimed at modernizing the Ottoman Empire 
based on a Western model. 
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were later incorporated into mid-20th century waqf law based on a combination of the 
waqf tradition and American foundation law (ibid, 191). 
 In the early 1980s, many new international Muslim FBOs formed to respond to 
conflicts in the Middle East and East Africa. This period coincided with the failure of 
secular nationalist movements and states in the Middle East and North Africa and the rise 
of global Islamist politics. Natural disasters and conflicts in Muslim-majority regions 
presented opportunities to demonstrate “Islamic solidarity.” Early aid efforts were funded 
by immigrant communities in the UK and other areas of the Global North and oil money 
from the Gulf States. In Afghanistan, many Islamist organizations openly allied 
themselves with the mujahidin3 and some combined relief activities at the Afghanistan-
Pakistan border with proselytizing and paramilitary activity (Benthall and Bellion-
Jourdan 2003, 83). During the 1990s conflict in Bosnia, some Muslim FBOs refused to 
aid Serbs and Croats, believing that solidarity with Bosnian Muslims precluded aiding 
their enemies, while others aided all sides, but saw their efforts as an opportunity to 
exhibit their faith to possible converts (ibid). Alongside these highly politically engaged 
Islamist groups, faith-based humanitarian organizations based in the UK like Muslim Aid 
and Islamic Relief also grew rapidly based on their work in Bosnia and the Horn of 
Africa. Islamic Relief, still in its infancy as an aid provider, saw its donation revenues 
quadruple in support of its Bosnia program (ibid, 133). 
 The involvement of paramilitary and missionary Islamist organizations in the 
conflicts of the 1980s and early 1990s haunt these relief-oriented, non-missionary 
Muslim FBOs that emerged during the same period. Such organizations, especially those 
                                                          
3 The Afghan mujahidin were groups of Islamist fighters engaged in a rebellion against the Soviet 
occupation of Afghanistan and the Soviet-aligned Afghan central government starting in the late 1970s.  
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headquartered in the Global North, have gone to great lengths to distance themselves 
from more faith-permeated groups and to disavow connections to “Global Terror”. 
Accusations of links to militancy multiplied after the September 11, 2001 attacks in New 
York and Washington DC, which many believed were funded by charitable fronts 
(Peterson 2011, 134). Zakat (much like jihad) has increasingly been falsely associated 
with terrorism, especially in the US. Although the UK Charity Commission encourages 
Muslim participation, in recent years, several Muslim charities in the US and UK have 
been charged with aiding terror groups and many have been added to the US State 
Department’s “designated foreign terrorist organization” list (Benthall 2011). In the 
Middle East and South Asia, Islamist political groups with charity wings were subject to 
crackdowns during this same period, as their activities were seen as threatening to the 
political order (Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan 2003, 77). 
In the U.S. during this period of growth in international Islamic charity, the 
immigrant Muslim community was growing rapidly. Before the passage of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, which eliminated many of the quotas that 
previously limited immigration from non-European countries, most Muslims in the US 
were African-American reverts4 and converts of other races and ethnicities (Nyang 1999; 
Smith 1999). Muslim organizations and spaces of worship experienced accelerated 
growth in the 1960s. Immigrant Sunni Muslim leadership coalesced around Muslim 
Student Associations (MSA), whose educated immigrant alumni, having secured visas in 
the 1960s and 1970s, established both local and national institutions (ibid). As of 2014, 
                                                          
4 The term “revert” here reflects the self-identification of many Muslim African-Americans who consider 
their Islamic practice to be a return to the faith of their West African ancestors who were forcibly converted 
to Christianity during enslavement. Historians agree that the first Muslim Americans were African slaves 
(see Nyang 1999, Smith 1999). 
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an estimated 61 percent of all Muslims in the US were first generation immigrants and an 
additional 17 percent had at least one foreign-born parent (Pew Research Center 2015, 
54). Rising Muslim populations include significant numbers of refugees. The post-Cold 
War period has witnessed conflict and displacement impacting Muslim communities in 
Iraq, former Yugoslavia, Uzbekistan, Sudan, Somalia, Afghanistan, Myanmar/Burma, 
and, most recently, Syria. In fiscal year 2015, majority-Muslim Iraqis were the second 
largest population of refugees resettled in the U.S. and majority-Muslim Somalis were the 
third largest (ORR 2016). 
The project of creating an American Islam and the Muslim community’s role in 
the immigrant experience have had a considerable impact on the function of mosques in 
the US. Mosques in the Middle East and South Asia are generally not social or 
community-building spaces, but purely places for worship. Women rarely pray at the 
mosque and little takes place there other than the call to prayer and Friday sermons. Since 
the late 1990s, scholars have observed that American mosques and their leaders are 
increasingly taking on non-traditional roles more like those of Christian and Jewish 
leaders and organizations, including providing pastoral care, facilitating wedding and 
funeral ceremonies, educating young people, and publicly representing their community 
in venues like interfaith programs (Nyang 1999; Smith 1999; Badr 2000). Women often 
take the lead in community-building and fundraising activities, reflecting the mosque’s 
reconfiguration as a social center open to entire families and the acceptance of women’s 
traditional role in social networking, particularly where sharing food is involved (Smith 
1999; Badr 2000). Hoda Badr’s case study of Al-Noor Mosque in Houston even describes 
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a halal “food stamp” and cash assistance program implemented by a formal “zakat 
committee” (2000).  
These changes to the mosque in the American context are a source of significant 
tension within some congregations. These debates usually divide recent arrivals and more 
established groups and can become particularly contentious when they involve “imported 
imams,” foreign religious scholars hired to lead mosques in the absence of qualified 
locals, especially those with desired language skills (Nyang 1999, 66). Trained outside of 
the US, these imams are often less sympathetic to reformist scholars who call for the 
adaptation of Islamic practice to the local context and/or are unprepared for additional 
responsibilities. For some, adoption of American customs seems to compromise the 
preservation of a distinct Muslim identity (Haddad and Lummis 1987, 68). Changes, 
then, often emanate from congregations, with young people and long-time members 
agitating for a different American Muslim practice and taking inspiration from popular 
public intellectuals. 
 With Muslim FBOs providing broadening social and community services, despite 
some internal resistance to change, they are becoming more accessible partners in the 
refugee resettlement process. The U.S. refugee resettlement system has a long recognized 
the utility of working with FBOs, designating voluntary agencies (known colloquially as 
“volags”) as partners in services for refugee reception and placement. This system 
originated in piece-meal responses to displacement during post-WWII reconstruction and 
the Cold War (Nichols 1988). It is notable, however, that government support has 
generally been allocated to FBOs representing the “Three Faiths” (Protestant Christian, 
Catholic, and Jewish). Of the nine voluntary organizations currently participating in the 
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U.S. Refugee Reception and Placement Program, four are affiliated with Protestant 
churches or missions, one with the Catholic Church, and one with the Jewish community. 
Two of the remaining three are explicitly secular and the last is associated with the 
Ethiopian community. 
Burgeoning religious diversity in the U.S., partially due to migration, is creating 
opportunities for groups outside of the “Three Faiths” to expand their charitable 
engagements. As early as 2003, a Center for Applied Linguistics (CAL) primer for 
providers serving Muslim refugees advised that “Resettlement offices can reach out to 
local mosques and Islamic schools and look for ways to collaborate on projects that will 
strengthen the resettlement network and provide a more coordinated support system for 
newly arriving refugees” (39). A recent article argues that faith-based actors play an 
important role in the successes of the U.S. refugee resettlement process because they 
constitute organizations based on deep commitments to service with preexisting ties to 
local community resources that can advocate for refugees (Eby et al. 2011). The authors 
cite statistics and ethnographic evidence that indicates that community co-sponsorship 
improves job prospects and feelings of positive integration. It also seems to improve 
perceptions of new refugee groups within religious communities.  
 Muslim migration and resettlement trends in Louisville seem to reflect national 
trends. The first mosques were established in the early 1980s by South Asian and Arab 
Muslims, most of whom came to the U.S. for work and education after changes in 
immigration law in the 1960s. In the 1990s, these communities were joined by refugees 
from Bosnia and Kosovo, Iraq (in small numbers compared to later trends), Libya, and 
Somalia (starting with the Banadir and Bravan minority groups, then the “Somali 
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Bantu”). The 2000s brought greater numbers from Somalia (including ethnic Somalis), 
Meskhetian Turks from the former Soviet Union, some Sudanese from the north 
(especially from the Darfur region), and the beginning of the most recent forced 
migration out of Iraq.  
 Louisville’s highly segregated racial and socioeconomic landscape has had a 
profound impact on the local geography of resettlement. A 2010 report from the 
Metropolitan Housing Commission states that “race, gender, disability, poverty, poor 
housing conditions, and poor health conditions are concentrated in the same areas of… 
[Jefferson] county” (4). These conditions are the legacy of a complex system of 
discriminatory housing policies implemented throughout the 20th century that resulted in 
disinvestment in African-American neighborhoods and the concentration of multifamily 
residences in particular parts of the city. As I discuss in more detail in Chapter II and 
Chapter III, segregation in Louisville has made cooperation between Muslim immigrant 
professionals and refugee populations more challenging; the community is spatially 
divided, replicating and perpetuating broader socioeconomic segregation. Muslim 
professionals tend to reside in Eastern Jefferson County, while refugees are housed in 
lower income neighborhoods in South and West Louisville. 
KRM is one of two resettlement agencies, the other being Catholic Charities, that 
take refugee cases in Louisville. KRM functions as an affiliate of two national voluntary 
organizations, Church World Service (CWS) and Episcopal Migration Ministries (EMM). 
Founded in 1990 by a member of Highland Presbyterian Church working from her 
kitchen and animated by the Christian call to welcome the stranger, KRM has expanded 
into one of the largest refugee resettlement organizations under the jurisdiction of the 
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Kentucky Office for Refugees. It now has an office in Lexington and a growing presence 
in Northern Kentucky. The Louisville office, located in an aging former nursing home 
tucked into a trendy neighborhood, is a disorienting maze of offices full of harried staff 
members and refugee clients speaking dozens of languages. Refugee mothers and fathers 
lead or carry young children or, on some days, children old enough to walk wander bored 
in the waiting room or the hall while their guardians sort through paperwork. KRM’s 
rapid growth means that few offices are private. Instead, donated desks and filing 
cabinets are shoved in every corner and staff work within talking distance of each other. 
The hallways and offices are busiest during breaks between daily English classes, as the 
second floor waiting room fills with clients jockeying for a chance to talk to their 
caseworkers and others relax with a bite to eat or a cigarette on the porch. 
Voluntary agency affiliates like KRM are barred from proselytizing or 
discriminating based on religion in their services, but they do have strong links to 
religious organizations. KRM has a strong relationship with Protestant churches in 
Louisville, especially the Presbyterian church, the Episcopal church, and some liberal 
Baptist churches. Staff members have a variety of reasons for feeling the need to serve 
refugees and, for many, religious faith is an important but generally unspoken part of 
that. Others see their work as part of a career path as a nonprofit professional. These two 
ideas are not mutually exclusive and the tension between these motivations is under the 
surface in KRM’s everyday workings. 
 Based on national standards for Resettlement and Placement (R&P) Services, 
resettlement agencies are required to provide certain types of assistance during the first 
90 days after the arrival of a refugee. These initially include procuring a rental apartment 
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or house of suitable size, furnishing it based on a list of required items, picking up the 
newly arrived family or individual at the airport, and providing a warm, culturally 
appropriate meal. Refugees are subsequently provided with aid in applying for public 
assistance, enrolling children in public school, enrolling in adult English classes (in 
Louisville, provided by the agency), and finding jobs for employable adults. In order to 
provide cost-effective and suitable services, even after the initial 90 day R&P period, 
which is often insufficient in the search for work and English education, KRM relies on 
private donations, grants, and volunteers. KRM also coordinates co-sponsorship 
programs in which a local organization, usually a church, agrees to help a refugee family 
by taking over some responsibility for R&P Services. The co-sponsors prepare the 
apartment or house, often with items donated by members, to save R&P money for more 
pressing expenses, pledge to donate an amount of money to supplement the federal 
allowance, greet the family at the airport, and provide them with local connections and 
social support. 
 The current moment is a contentious time for the U.S. refugee program and 
immigrant Muslim communities across the U.S. As fieldwork for this study was 
conducted, the newly inaugurated President Trump issued two nearly identical executive 
orders in January and March 2017 temporarily banning nationals of seven majority-
Muslim countries from entering the U.S. and suspending the refugee program for 120 
days pending investigation of security procedures in the vetting process. The orders also 
sought to reduce the cap on refugee arrivals from 110,000 to 50,000. During this 
fieldwork, both orders were stayed pending court rulings on their constitutionality, but on 
June 26, 2017, the Supreme Court issued a decision allowing the 120 day suspension of 
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refugee arrivals to begin, but exempting “foreign nationals who have a credible claim of a 
bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States,” (International 
Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump 582 U. S. 12 (2017)). Muslim immigrants and 
refugees have become wary of travel and fear rumors of future Muslim internment 
camps. The refugee program is in a state of limbo and it is unclear whether declining 
arrival numbers will continue to justify current infrastructure. Refugee resettlement 
agencies across the country have frozen hiring and are considering or implementing lay-
offs. KRM has been able to maintain its budget so far because it has diversified its 
funding sources over the years, but it is unclear what the future will hold, since President 
Trump’s Fiscal Year 2018 Proposed Budget specifically names refugees as overly taxing 
on the Department of Health and Human Services’ funding (Office of Management and 
Budget 2017). Recent events have further cemented the political entwinement of 
Islamophobic and xenophobic rhetoric that came to the fore in response to a series of 
terror attacks in Paris in November 2015 in which suspects were initially rumored to have 
entered France along with a group of Syrian refugees. At that time, media attention was 
fixed on refugee resettlement as it had never been before and a strong association was 
built between “refugee” and “Muslim.” This connection was so strong that individuals 
began to regularly write checks to Louisville mosques to “help the refugees.” This 
phenomenon is discussed in more detail later.  
 
Methods 
 Data collection for this project consisted of ethnographic methods in the form of a 
combination of participant observation and semi-structured interviews over a period of 
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six months (January 2017-May 2017). I observed and took part in volunteer work and 
public events at the offices of Kentucky Refugee Ministries as well as four large Islamic 
centers5 (three Sunni centers and one Shi’a center) and a local Turkish cultural center that 
is often used as a gathering and worship space. These methods provided valuable 
information on the dynamics of relationships between employees, volunteers, the 
resettlement agency, and clients.   
 A total of nineteen semi-structured interviews were conducted with three sets of 
participants. The first group were three employees of KRM who had been directly 
involved in partnerships with Muslim communities. This included a Muslim community 
leader, as KRM employs individuals of all faith backgrounds and some of them are 
leaders in their religious communities. The second group of participants were thirteen 
Muslim community leaders and volunteers who have collected donations and participated 
in co-sponsorships with KRM. “Community leaders” included both individuals with 
formal standing and titles and well-respected, active community members. These leaders 
represented a variety of community groups segmented by sect, race, ethnicity, and class. 
The third group were seven refugees and former refugees (overlapping with the other two 
groups) who participated in and/or directly benefitted from Muslim community support, 
and encompassed individuals from Iraq, Somalia, and Syria. These three groups were 
chosen because they have demonstrated a willingness to seek support from the Muslim 
community, likely because their populations are majority Muslim, and they represent 
                                                          
5 Although all four of these organizations use the designation “Islamic center” in their official names, 
participants often referred to them interchangeably as “Islamic center” and “mosque”. The usage of 
“mosque” and “Islamic center” in this thesis reflects that usage. 
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variation along perceived racial, ethnic, and sectarian lines. Three of these individuals 
were recent arrivals from Syria. 
Potential interview participants were identified during participant observation and 
invited to participate in person with an explanation of the purpose of the study and an 
exchange of contact information. The snowball method, which involves the use of 
referrals at the end of each interview, were also used to expand recruitment while also 
serving to identify social networks. This method was chosen because the study group was 
small and diffuse and thus locating important group members required networking with 
group members and KRM staff. The snowball method is also an effective sampling 
method in this case because connecting through references builds trust between the 
researcher and the participants. 
Interviews ranged from forty-five minutes to an hour and a half and sought to 
answer the following descriptive questions: How is the relationship between KRM and 
mosques/Islamic centers structured? How has the relationship changed over time? How 
effective do stakeholders perceive their relationship to be? What challenges have they 
witnessed in developing and maintaining the relationship? What advantages or 
disadvantages does the current system display as compared to the past? What do 
stakeholders think could be improved about KRM and mosques/Islamic centers’ 
partnership? (See Appendix A for a full interview schedule.) Consent for participation in 
this study was obtained orally before beginning interviews with the use of a preamble. 
Interviews were documented using an audio recording device and later transcribed. When 
necessary and possible, follow-up interviews were conducted to clarify data and solicit 
additional information. Following standard anthropological ethics, all participant names 
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have been replaced with pseudonyms and some identifiable information has not been 
disclosed. This allows participants to speak freely without fear of consequences. 
Following data collection, I identified themes relevant to the previously identified 
research questions and coded the notes and transcripts based on those themes using QDA 
Minor Lite. Then the coded data was analyzed based on relevant theoretical frameworks. 
Follow-up meetings with stakeholders to collaborate on possible courses of action and 
policy recommendations based on the findings are anticipated.  
 My positionality as a white, American, non-Muslim woman and a former 
employee at KRM is an important factor to consider as part of this fieldwork. KRM 
employees were often familiar former co-workers and friends, which made them 
extremely open to discussing sensitive topics. At the same time, it often meant that they 
felt it unnecessary to explain agency processes. In most fieldwork settings, I was readily 
associated with KRM and refugees and Muslim volunteers assumed, despite my attempts 
at clarification, that I was attending events as an agency representative. To my 
knowledge, this was always a positive association; as an English instructor, I was rarely 
associated with tough casework decisions and I occasionally provided basic interpretation 
support for Arabic-speaking clients. At times, this meant that interlocutors asked me 
policy questions as an assumed “expert.” I was not always able to meet their 
expectations. Participants still seemed quite willing to critique KRM’s services in my 
presence, but it is likely that their criticisms would have been more pointed and harsher if 
I was not associated with the organization. 
 As a woman entering gender-segregated Muslim spaces, I spent far more time 
interacting with women during participant observation. Some public events were less 
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segregated than others, but my field notes still speak less clearly to men’s roles and 
participation. There is a positive side to this: as I elaborate later, the most active Muslim 
volunteers are women and young adults who, having grown-up in the U.S., are less 




MUSLIM REFUGEE EXPERIENCES IN NARRATION 
 
I met Adan at an event organized by KRM to promote the co-sponsorship 
program. A young man at the mosque where he serves on the executive board had 
encouraged him to attend. With his dark skin and colorful prayer cap, he stood out in the 
mostly white group of attendees. As a former refugee, a member of the Bravan ethnic 
group from Somalia, and a Muslim community leader, he was clearly in the minority. He 
considered the proceedings with a serious air, thoughtfully nodding and talking very 
little. Later, he tells me about when there were no ethnic groceries in Louisville, few 
mosques, and not many people who looked or sounded like him. As an interpreter for 
several languages, he has witnessed how Louisville has changed over the years. When I 
ask him about Somali community groups, he shakes his head and tells me a story about 
the Meskhetian Turks. He was interpreting for a group of Arabic speakers one day and a 
group of Turks approached him and excitedly started asking him questions in broken 
English. They had seen his prayer cap and were desperate for information about other 
Muslims. A community member had died unexpectedly and they didn’t want to bury her 
in a Christian cemetery. He helped them arrange a burial in the Muslim cemetery and 
eventually connected them with the mosques in town. Ending the story, he said that these 
people had worked very hard, “most of them live in very nice areas, huge buildings, those 
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who were living in Dena Drive, those who were living in Southside, everybody moved to 
a nice house because they are more civilized than our people; our people, their priority is 
saving money.” In expressing his disappointment with the Somali community’s 
propensity for sending money away to extended family without improving their own 
living conditions and their comparative poverty, Adan compared them to another Muslim 
refugee group. 
Throughout my fieldwork, these sorts of comparisons were common, especially 
those that celebrated the relative success of the Meskhetian Turks and Bosnians in 
comparison to the considerable struggles that Iraqis and Somalis continue to face. These 
narratives are key to how locals, especially observant Muslims, understand the processes 
of resettlement and adaptation and how they set expectations for new groups. They also 
shed light on how they define “making it” and what indicators they look for when 
determining what groups have been successful and why. After a brief historical overview 
of the largest majority-Muslim refugee and immigrant groups that have arrived in 
Louisville since the 1990s, this chapter describes and explores three major themes about 
the refugee resettlement experience culled from stories that Muslim community members 
tell: housing struggles and quality, community organization, and workforce 
professionalization. Refugees’ success at moving into better housing conditions, creating 
community groups, and achieving a level of education that allows for a class of educated 
professionals is key to their recognition as model migrants in the Muslim community.  
These three themes are eminently linked to desires to move beyond self-
sufficiency to wealth. Refugees, like other migrants to the US, strive for the material 
trappings of the American dream, things that show that they are not just able to get by, 
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but that they are thriving and building a better future for their children. While 
resettlement agencies focus on social and economic stability and a degree of 
independence from state aid as part of their programmatic goals, denoted in their 
terminology as “self-sufficiency,” community members tend to have longer term and 
more ambitious goals and expectations in line with more broadly American hopes and 
dreams. After the initial resettlement period, success means upward mobility.   
Determining the objective veracity of the many narratives explored here is beyond 
the scope of this project and is not the goal of ethnography. Some of these narratives are 
second or third hand accounts about events that took place over twenty years ago. There 
are many robust written accounts of these groups’ struggles in their country of origin and 
in exile as well as their American journeys (see: Besteman 2016; Hansen 2003; 
Mirkhanova 2006; Sassoon 2011). What is important for this account of charitable 
responses is the different ways that these refugee experiences are perceived and narrated. 
They both reflect and shape the ways in which Muslims in Louisville, representing 
contrasting migration experiences and divided in terms of race, ethnicity, and class, have 
attempted to create a collective approach to supporting new refugee populations. 
Muslim immigrants to Louisville before the 1990s, as mentioned previously, were 
mostly part of a national trend of immigrant graduate students and professionals from the 
Middle East and South Asia who came to the US after the passage of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1965. Some had likely arrived among the mostly Christian Lebanese 
and Syrian immigrants of the early 20th century, but these immigrants were few in 
number and it does not seem that they organized around their faith. In 1980, after years of 
worshipping in homes and rented spaces, a group of these professional immigrant 
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Muslims constructed Louisville’s first purpose-built mosque just down the street from the 
Lebanese American Country Club on River Road. Professional opportunities continue to 
attract immigrants from Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan, 
India, Bangladesh, and many other countries with large Muslim populations to Louisville. 
In their own migration experiences, these immigrants have used their education and 
strong English skills as an entré into the middle and upper classes. 
According to long-time community members and KRM staff members, the first 
Bosnian refugees arrived in Louisville in 1992 fleeing civil war in what was then a 
disintegrating Yugoslavia. They were the first majority-Muslim group to be resettled to 
Louisville in large numbers with arrivals continuing until 2002. In 1999, they were joined 
by Kosovar refugees, many of whom were also practicing Muslims with shared 
languages and traditions. Both groups had high average levels of education in their 
country of origin. Almost all adult Bosnian and Kosovar refugees had at least a high 
school education and a large number had attended university or technical school.  
Somali resettlement started in 1994 and proceeded in waves based on membership 
in vulnerable groups or groups of special interest to the US. A small number of Somalis 
who had worked in embassies arrived in 1994 and 1995 fleeing civil war, followed by 
members of the Banadir ethnic group in 1996, ethnic Bravans in 1997, and “Somali 
Bantus”6 starting in 2004. Ethnic Somalis arrived later, and are still represented in 
Louisville’s caseload, coming through both Catholic Charities and KRM; community 
members report that some ethnic Somalis had arrived earlier along with the Banadirs, 
                                                          
6 “Bantu” is a term that was coined by Italian colonizers to describe riverine agriculturalists in southern 
Somalia who had originally been brought to the area as slaves. These groups had no shared ethnic identity 
until persecution during the Somali Civil War and marginalization in Kenyan refugee camps brought them 
together (Besteman 2016, 79-81).  
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Bravans, and Bantus. Banadirs and Bravans are mostly from coastal cities where they 
were involved in maritime trade and the fishing industry. Most Somali Bantu are from 
rural areas and many had no access to secondary education in Somalia. Somali refugees 
have experienced extremely protracted displacement due to continuous conflict in the 
region since the early 1990s. Many young adults were born and raised in Kenyan refugee 
camps where Somalis have no right to work and no right to travel outside of the camp 
borders. 
The first, small group of Iraqi refugees came to Louisville between 1996 and 1997 
through a US military evacuation program aimed at protecting those associated with the 
US government in Iraqi Kurdistan from an Iraqi military incursion. Most Iraqis arrived in 
Louisville after the 2003 US invasion of Iraq and subsequent sectarian conflict, with 
numbers increasing in 2007 and continuing to the present. Louisville receives a 
significant number of SIV (special immigrant visa) cases, or families granted permission 
to come directly from Iraq to the US because a family member was employed by the US 
military and is now in danger due to that affiliation. While SIVs are not refugees based 
on the standards of international law, they experience many of the same challenges as 
refugees and receive the same support afforded to refugees during resettlement. Iraqi 
refugees are unique among Muslim refugees in Louisville in that there are both large 
Iraqi Sunni and Shi’a Muslim communities. There is also a significant linguistic and 
cultural divide in the resettled community between Sunni Muslim Arabs and Kurds.  
A small but significant migration of Meskhetian (or Ahiska) Turkish refugees 
from the Krasnodar region of Russia, where they had experienced discrimination and 
statelessness after a history of repeated displacement, occurred between 2004 and 2006. 
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In Russia, Meskhetian Turks were unable to pursue most types of vocational training or 
other forms of education because of widespread discrimination. Their job prospects were 
limited to agriculture and unskilled labor. Since their arrival in Louisville, their 
community has often collaborated with and received assistance from the Bosnian 
community as their shared Ottoman history means that they have many traditions and 
linguistic features in common.  
Other than the close relationships between Bosnians, Kosovars, and Meskhetians 
and widespread organizing between different immigrant professional groups, social 
contact between different Muslim refugee and immigrant groups was very limited until 
recently. Still, brief contacts and rumors led to the following, surprisingly coherent set of 
narratives and beliefs about which refugees were successful, which were not, and why 
that was the case. 
Housing 
The physical location where resettlement begins has taken on special meaning in 
Louisville. The neighborhoods and, to some extent, the apartment complexes where 
refugees live on arrival have not changed considerably since the late 1990s. This is 
unsurprising when one considers the barriers that resettlement agencies face when 
attempting to find affordable housing; landlords must agree to rent to a family before they 
arrive with no credit, no social security number, and no secure income. Landlords who 
will agree to these terms are few and tend to be in low income neighborhoods. 
Resettlement agencies often develop a relationship with certain landlords, or certain 
rental companies, to guarantee housing for future refugees. These apartment complexes 
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have taken on connotations of poverty and struggle. If you are successful, you move. If 
you are not successful, you stay. 
When immigrants and refugees talk about the success enjoyed by the Meskhetian 
Turks or the Bosnians, they often talk about their homes. This is evident in Adan’s 
account of the Meskhetian Turks moving into large homes. A Turkish immigrant who 
knows many of the Meskhetian refugees gave a similar account, saying “When I first 
came here that was their fourth year or fifth year and they all have nice cars and nice 
houses in this really short amount of time… they all live in the same big house like 
everybody's working like man, woman, everybody.” Bosnians, they say, worked their 
way into similar accommodations. 
Moving out of these poorer neighborhoods is a key part of many former refugees’ 
hopes for the future. When discussing housing conditions for new arrivals, Marwa, an 
Iraqi woman who came to Louisville to join her husband many years ago, commented 
that she would like to move to the East End someday. She says that the environment in 
her neighborhood and the other neighborhoods where new refugees live is not good for 
their morale and that their children pick up bad influences from these places. She 
qualified her statements with a familiar refrain, “Iraq is a rich country”. This phrase is 
often used when Iraqis from wealthy families, especially SIVs, attempt to understand the 
dissonance of moving from a country where they were well-off and well-respected to a 
country where they live in relatively poor conditions and work for low wages. It is also a 
reaction to fellow refugees from other countries who do not seem to be as shocked or 
disappointed by housing or employment conditions in the US. 
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The current conditions that resettled Somali refugees experience complicates this 
picture of successful families escaping poor neighborhoods. While some Somalis share 
the same ambition of leaving the apartment complexes and neighborhoods where they are 
placed, they face additional barriers to moving into more affluent neighborhoods because 
they are doubly marked as Black and Muslim in an American context. For example, a 
young Somali man who participates in charitable work recalled a time when he and his 
wife went to look for an apartment in Jeffersontown, a middle class, mostly white and 
South Asian suburb. He saw a “for rent” sign at one complex, but when he inquired about 
the apartment at the office an employee told him that the apartment was no longer 
available. Suspecting racial discrimination, he asked his wife, who had been waiting in 
the car, to call; the same employee told her that an apartment was available. There are 
clearly reasons beyond financial success or failure that prevent Somalis from moving to 
different areas. 
Furthermore, some of the strategies that Somalis use to support their families 
actively disincentivize moving into wealthier neighborhoods. First, most Somalis 
prioritize transnational ties with family members in Somalia or Somali refugee camps and 
support one or more other families with remittances. Some go as far as to invest in 
businesses or real estate in Somalia, hoping that they will one day return to peace and a 
secure income in their country of origin. This is no small feat considering the average 
size of a Somali family; not taking extended kin into account, it is not uncommon for a 
Somali couple to care for five or more children. These financial priorities make for a 
small household budget and incentivize staying in low rent apartments. Even Adan, who 
frowns on the practice of sending so much money out of the country, admits that relatives 
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expect remittances and the money goes much farther in Somalia or Kenya that it does in 
the US. He is still frustrated that so many families with sufficient income tighten their 
belts and send their money away instead of investing it in Louisville. He feels that this 
makes them look “uncivilized” and “disreputable.” 
In addition, proximity can outweigh the disadvantages of living in an undesirable 
area. Mukhtaar, a former member of Somali Youth of Louisville who arrived as a 
teenager, explains that many Somalis prefer to live in the same neighborhoods, even if 
the apartment complexes are not safe or well-maintained, because they can share 
resources more easily. For example, he remembers that before he had a car, he would 
walk from school to Somali Mall, a building where Somalis rent spaces to run businesses 
in a market style. He would chat and drink coffee with other young men then, when he 
was ready to leave, he would catch a ride home from anyone driving to his neighborhood. 
Until they can afford a car, many Somalis use a similar method to carpool to work or the 
grocery store. He criticizes KRM for settling Somalis in new and different neighborhoods 
because this makes it more difficult for them to meet other Somalis and take advantage of 
their support. As far as he is concerned, housing conditions are immaterial as long as 
people live close to each other and are able to build and maintain good social relations. 
Staying in these neighborhoods is not failure; it is adaptation. Talking about a recent visit 
to an apartment complex with many Somali residents, he smiles while describing clothing 
hung to dry on every surface. It reminds him of the refugee camp where he grew up in 
Kenya. “This apartment needs a laundry room,” he remarks. What for some is a mark of a 
continuing struggle for survival that shouldn’t properly be thought of as success can seem 
advantageous from an alternate perspective. 
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Despite these alternative narratives, the most popular narratives hold that moving 
out is the first step in a refugee success story. There are clearly aspects of this rooted in 
the realities of living in low-income housing in Louisville. As I discuss in more detail in 
the next chapter, apartments in these neighborhoods are often plagued by pest 
infestations, negligent landlords, and high crime rates. Just this year, a young Somali girl 
was critically injured while watching TV in her family’s apartment when a stray bullet 
came through a window and struck her. The bitter irony of refugees fearing everyday 
violence and bearing poor living conditions in the US after fleeing violence and poor 
living conditions in their countries of origin is not lost on KRM staff or Muslim 
volunteers. Despite the advantages of pooling resources in ethnic or national enclaves 
created through placement on arrival, moving out remains a salient indicator that a 
refugee community is moving up in the world. 
Organizing Community 
 The ability to organize formal community events and spaces is narrated 
simultaneously as a cause of refugee success and a sign that refugees have become 
successful. While refugees often start connecting informally with members of their 
ethnic, sectarian, or national communities soon after arrival, it usually takes many years 
for community members to organize formal gatherings and many more to pool the money 
necessary to rent or buy a space in which to gather. Two former refugee community 
members guessed, based on their experience, that it takes about five years for refugees to 
settle in and become stable enough to invest time, energy, and money into organizations. 
Both agreed that the investment was worth it and filled basic social and material needs. 
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 Meskhetian Turks were again identified as the model group by this standard. One 
Turkish interviewee called their community an “unbelievable support mechanism” built 
on meeting collective needs. It is notable that the Meskhetian Turks arrived in Louisville 
to an already present community of immigrant Turkish professionals who became a huge 
resource during their initial period of resettlement. In 2006, only a year after the most of 
them arrived, a national Gülenist7 organization established a Turkish cultural center that 
they still use as a gathering place for social, educational, and religious activities. Turkish 
immigrants dominate leadership positions in the center, but most families that utilize the 
center are former refugees. Narratives about the Meskhetian Turks praise their strong 
work ethic and their willingness to work together to solve problems and educate the next 
generation, attributing their success to these factors. 
 Following a slightly slower trajectory, the Bosnians are still lauded as a success 
story. Bosnians in Louisville started gathering for celebrations and traditional activities in 
the late 1990s and, in 2001, they founded the Bosniak American Islamic Center, hiring an 
imam from Bosnia so that they could listen to religious sermons in their mother tongue 
and teach the language to their children. Taking advantage of the large number of skilled 
tradesmen in the local Bosnian community, leaders recently decided to demolish the 
Islamic Center building so they could build a purpose-built mosque in its place. 
Continuing their strong relationship with the Meskhetian refugees, Bosnians now worship 
and hold meetings in the local Turkish center. These two communities have a uniquely 
                                                          
7 This refers to the organization’s affiliation with the popular Turkish cleric and opposition leader Fethullah 
Gülen, whose foundations fund many educational, religious, charitable, and political groups in Turkey and 
abroad. Gülen and an increasing number of his followers live in exile in the US. 
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entangled migration history in which they have often turned to each other for assistance 
and collaborated on events and projects. 
 Shortly after the beginning of this fieldwork, it became clear that I would hear 
very little about Iraqis in Louisville from Sunni Muslims unless I asked about them 
directly. The stories I heard were vague and, apart from a couple of Arab women, 
everyone seemed either uncomfortable with the topic or not very knowledgeable. For 
reasons that they could not explain, Iraqis didn’t organize themselves well and they 
reported that many families were disconnected and struggling on their own. Finally, one 
woman said what everyone else had danced around, “Oh, the Iraqis are mostly Shi’a. 
They do their own things.” The sectarian divide in Louisville’s Muslim community, and 
particularly in the Iraqi community, remains a strong but rarely articulated undercurrent. 
Coming from a largely secular country, many Iraqis are simply not observant 
Muslims or, having witnessed increasing religious sectarianism and radicalization in Iraq, 
have become wary of religious organizations. This confuses the issue for former 
immigrants and refugees for whom faith is central to a national or cultural identity. Adan 
told me the story of meeting an Iraqi doctor by coincidence while taking his son for a 
check-up. He said that when he told the doctor that there were many Iraqi refugees in 
Louisville, "He told me they're not supposed to be here, I said ‘What do you mean?’ He 
said, ‘We are a rich country.’ I said, ‘You know what happened, what's going on?’" The 
doctor said he had lived in Louisville for 40 years and Adan said with disapproval that he 
had never seen him at any mosque or event and never saw him again. The implication of 
this and many other similar narratives is that when educated professionals fail to 
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participate in their national, ethnic, and religious communities, other community 
members suffer and the whole group’s reputation is damaged. 
While observant Iraqi Sunnis attend various large and small Arab-majority 
mosques around the city and, like their secular counterparts, do not engage in much 
ethnic-based social organizing, Iraqis constitute the majority population at local Shi’a 
Islamic centers. In these centers, they actively seek to create Iraqi national community. 
Even the small number of Lebanese, Egyptian, Iranian, and Pakistani immigrants who 
attend the largest center say that religious observances there mostly follow Iraqi religious 
traditions. One day a week, the center holds classes in which the children of refugees 
learn Arabic with an Iraqi public school curriculum, then practice English while learning 
about religious topics. Although the Shi’a community has significantly less resources in 
general, those resources are distributed more evenly and Shi’a of multiple ethnic, 
national, and class backgrounds collaborate to build community. Iraqi Sunnis do not 
benefit from these community building activities, giving an impression from the Sunni 
perspective that Iraqis just never organize and suffer the consequences of this. 
Somali communities in Louisville and elsewhere have also struggled with 
profound ethnic divides within their national group and general organizational 
dysfunctionality (see Besteman 2016). Informally, ethnic Somalis take responsibility for 
local families that have fallen on hard times based on their clan, with more financially 
stable individuals from the same clan providing loans and advice. If people from your 
clan are not doing well, it is considered shameful for you to neglect them. In contrast to 
this fairly successful informal system, early attempts at official organizing ended in 
distrust and power disputes. Group members often assumed that leaders were paid 
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whether or not they were and felt that those with titles did too much without consulting 
the rest of the group. On top of these tensions, older Somalis were often unwilling to 
work with members of different ethnic groups, despite their common nationality, because 
of memories of persecution and conflict in Somalia and in the refugee camps. 
More recent attempts by younger Somalis who grew up in the US or Kenya have 
been more successful and there is now a group for Somali young adults and one for 
Somali women, both of which have attracted members from Bravan, Banadir, Bantu, and 
ethnic Somali backgrounds. A group of Somalis recently raised enough money to buy a 
small building in the West End and make it into a Somali-language mosque. Members of 
the community who did not understand English had spent years attending Friday prayers 
at mosques where they were unable to understand the sermon and unable to communicate 
effectively with mosque leadership. When asked why it took so long to establish the 
mosque, one young Somali made a direct comparison to one East End mosque, which he 
said had cost $2 million dollars, “That money doesn't come from someone who makes 
$1200 a month, it comes from someone who makes more than that.” Somalis, with their 
low average level of education and high prioritization of remittances, struggled for years 
to put together the $100,000 that it took to buy and renovate their worship space. This 
slow pace as compared to Bosnians and Turks was read by both outsiders and some 
Somalis as an indicator of Somali backwardness and inadequacy. Thus, popular 
narratives again idealize Bosnian and Meskhetian Turkish resettlement and hold up Iraqis 
and Somalis as groups that have not yet “made it,” examples of what trajectories and 




 Creating educated professionals is another high priority on the path to successful 
community advancement. I have placed this priority last because it generally concerns 
refugee children and young adults who grow up in the US, not refugees who arrive in the 
US in middle age. Young people, the narrative claims, will finalize upward class mobility 
by becoming doctors, engineers, lawyers, and other types of professionals. This will 
reflect well on their community and result in more resources for the community in 
general, allowing for greater acts of charity, better facilities for ethnic organizations and 
worship groups, and a better quality of life on average. Ambitions of the second 
generation getting a good education and achieving success in well-paid fields is not 
notable in and of itself, as these goals have become core to the American dream for a 
variety of immigrant and refugee groups. What is notable is the way in which talking 
about education, or its absence, has become a proxy for discussing class and prestige. 
 Yet again, the Meskhetian Turks and Bosnians take the lead in this indicator. 
Bosnians had mixed levels of education on arrival, with many people trained in skilled 
trades or with university degrees. Many young Bosnians have successfully completed 
university degrees and even some adults have succeeded in recertifying in their previous 
fields of study or earning new credentials, which is no small feat in the US. The 
Meskhetian Turks, unable to secure the right to consistent education in Russia, mostly 
arrived with trade skills, but some members of the second generation are now becoming 
more educated and entering professional fields. In one case, a Meskhetian man lied that 
he had a high school diploma from Russia, but it had been lost, so that he could enroll in 
Jefferson Community and Technical College instead of struggling through starting high 
school as an 18-year-old. He eventually transferred to the University of Louisville and 
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recently graduated from medical school. Turks in Louisville hold up his success as a 
model for making it in the US and express deep pride for the Meskhetian kids now 
graduating from American high schools and entering university. Their success, they feel, 
is a sign of their community’s success. 
 Interestingly, in the Meskhetian case, the community has carefully constructed an 
outward image that privileges a high level of education. Although the vast majority of 
Turks in Louisville who participate in nationality-centered organizing are Meskhetian 
refugees, leadership positions are held primarily by Turkish immigrants with middle and 
upper-class backgrounds and professional degrees, many of whom have been in 
Louisville for far less time than the refugees. In interviews, these immigrants made it 
clear that they had been asked to take these titles specifically because of their educational 
background and how that reflected on the community. This is likely important not only 
for Turks’ local reputation, but for the Gülenist image, as encouraging a well-rounded 
education is one of the core priorities emphasized by the movement. 
 Somalis face similar obstacles to academic advancement as the Meskhetian Turks, 
but lack the guidance that could be provided by an immigrant professional co-national 
community. Comparing Somalis to the Syrians, Adan, himself well-educated and from 
the city, lamented “We didn't have anything here, nobody to provide us advice or to 
support us.” When people talk about the weaknesses of the Somali community and the 
difficulties Somalis have had, they say that “Somalis are not professionals.” They take 
low wage warehouse and factory positions. A Turkish volunteer expressed his frustration 
that there were not enough Somalis with master’s degrees, who, as he described it, had 
“made it,” to act as mentors and role models for Somali children. Although many young 
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Somalis are now in college, few have graduated and fewer still are pursuing those 
coveted professional positions like doctor or engineer. This is the progress that many in 
the community anticipate, but they believe that it will take a long time because there is 
just no time for education – in most families, every adult must work to make ends meet 
and some take multiple jobs so they can send more remittances. Here, lack of education is 
narrated as both part of the problem that perpetuates Somali poverty and an indicator of 
deficiency. 
Analysis 
 KRM staff members and refugees often talk about what “expectations” mean for 
the resettlement process. Refugees with high expectations, they hold, are less satisfied 
with resettlement services than those with low expectations or those who do not know 
what to expect. The same, they say, applies to co-sponsors and volunteers. Co-sponsors 
who have never seen or experienced poverty because of a prosperous upbringing or have 
never spent time with people from other countries are more likely to protest and complain 
about resettlement services. One long time KRM employee said of some co-sponsors 
that, no matter how much you try to prepare them, “They don't have any place to hang 
that information.” What about Muslim volunteers? Discussions of other refugee groups 
that I encountered during fieldwork show that, in contrast, Muslim volunteers have many 
places to “hang” information about resettlement. 
 These narratives highlight the differences between Muslim volunteers and 
previous groups of volunteers and co-sponsors, many of whom had never encountered a 
refugee before their work with KRM. Members of Muslim volunteer groups, which 
consist of mostly immigrant professionals and their families with a few former refugees 
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who arrived in the 1990s, have preconceived ideas about who Muslim refugees are and 
what that means about their future. They can imagine a path to success in more detail 
because they can combine the details of their journey or their parents’ journey with 
anecdotes about past refugee groups and their experiences with meeting members of 
these groups at mosques and community events. As I describe in more detail in Chapter 
IV, Muslims working with Muslim arrivals feel a strong, personal obligation to make 
sure that the refugees make correct decisions and project a good image for others from 
the Middle East and other Muslims. This makes them less likely to accept the path that 
KRM arranges within the bounds of the US refugee resettlement program without 
reservations.  
 Taken in aggregate, what conclusions do Muslim community members draw from 
these narratives and how might they be applied to the Syrians? First, they learn that 
refugees who succeed leave poor neighborhoods to escape the bad environment in which 
they have been placed. Therefore, they infer that Syrian refugees must move to better 
areas as soon as possible. Second, they learn that refugees who are connected to each 
other and to other members of their national community in both formal and informal 
ways are more successful. This leads them to prioritize enhancing Syrians’ connections to 
co-nationals and co-ethnics. Third, they learn that educated refugees and refugees that 
become educated gain higher prestige and experience a higher degree of social mobility. 
This leads them to encourage Syrian young adults to pursue higher education instead of 
employment. In many ways, these priorities are not significantly different from those of 
the refugees themselves, but they are beyond the parameters of KRM’s program goals on 
arrival. As the next chapter discusses, while this prioritization of specific long-term goals 
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is a seemingly minor difference, it can lead to significantly different understandings of 





MATERIAL ASSISTANCE AND RESETTLEMENT AGENCY COLLABORATION 
 
Sister Ameera is retired, but she isn’t the sort of person who takes breaks. Every 
few minutes, the former teacher turned community organizer looks sheepishly at her 
phone and asks me to wait while she answers. Patiently maternal but visibly frustrated, 
she assures one caller, then chides another while looking at the clock over my shoulder, 
“Aren’t you on your way, ḥabībī? The driving test is at 2:00! You’ll be late!” Sighing as 
she hangs up the phone, she explains that this is this Syrian man’s second chance to take 
the test and the volunteer she contacted had promised to drive him. They would call with 
the result. The first time, he failed because he couldn’t understand what the police officer 
was telling him; she has learned over the years that some officers are nicer and easier to 
understand than others and hopes he is lucky this time. Ameera came to Louisville from 
North Africa over forty years ago when her husband was accepted into a graduate 
program at University of Louisville. She is one of very few volunteers who has been 
active since the 1990s, working with every Muslim refugee or immigrant group at some 
point or another and donating generously to local Islamic centers, schools, and individual 
refugee families. These days she spends her days organizing women’s halaqāt 
(Qurʾan/religion study groups) in people’s homes, drinking tea in refugee families’ living 
rooms, and accompanying families who have timed out of resettlement agency support to 
the doctor or the food stamp office. When women have a problem that they don’t want to 
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bring to the imam, they bring it to her and she passes it on. When she speaks in a 
meeting, the room gets quiet and people listen. Yet, communication with the resettlement 
agencies has become tough. They used to tell her and the other sisters when a Syrian 
family arrived and now it’s a mystery. Recently, a Syrian woman ended up in the hospital 
shortly after arrival and no one could visit her for several days because the news took 
time to spread. Another time, a family arrived on Friday and ended up stuck alone in a 
cold apartment all weekend. What good does it do for the new refugees to be 
disconnected like this? The call finally comes and it’s good news. Not only did the Syrian 
man get to the test on time, but he passed! Ameera excuses herself. She needs pay a visit 
to congratulate him. 
This chapter discusses the period before, during, and immediately after KRM 
received its community engagement grant from Islamic Relief USA. It chronicles the 
forms of support, especially material support, that members of the Muslim community 
provided and how that support changed with the grant and the arrival of the first Syrian 
refugees in Louisville in 2014. In exploring KRM’s relationship with the Muslim 
community and the forms of aid provided by Muslim volunteers, I argue that the essential 
differences between KRM and Muslim community groups’ models of support for 
refugees can make it difficult for them to establish mutual understanding. The volunteers 
observed in this study prioritize long-term success and respectability over KRM’s more 
short-term goal of self-sufficiency. They create close, personal relationships with Syrian 
refugees that go beyond the bounds of professionalism as it is usually understood in a 
social services office, which gained them the highest levels of trust. These differences, as 
well as these groups’ lack of formal organization, can make them challenging for a 
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resettlement agency to work with, but informality is also a strength in that it gives them 
the freedom and flexibility to allocate resources with few restrictions, filling service gaps 
when KRM cannot. 
Before Islamic Relief 
 The educated Muslim immigrant professionals who had established the earliest 
worship spaces near the University of Louisville and in the wealthy East End remained 
mostly unaware of the challenging circumstances in which their refugee neighbors were 
living until recently. Refugees who arrived in the mid-1990s remember being visited in 
their homes after their first visit to the mosque or after showing interest in attending. One 
early Bosnian arrival recalled being invited to an ifṭār dinner during his first Ramadan in 
the US and meeting men who he would later learn were university professors. He took 
great pride in greeting them on campus when he later studied at University of Louisville. 
A Somali man who arrived only a couple of years later was visited by two men, a doctor 
and a university student, after he attended Friday prayer at a mosque near the university. 
They advised him that there was a small mosque in Buechal, closer to his home. 
Confused by the transportation system in Louisville, he called a taxi to make the short 
drive and ended up asking an Indian man in the parking lot to help him break a $20 bill 
and pay the cab fare. The man turned out to be a professor at Bellarmine and when he 
found out about the Somali man’s transportation problems, he offered to drive him from 
work to the mosque and home every Friday. This sort of interaction became less common 
as both the Muslim community and the refugee community in Louisville grew and 
mosque attendance became more segregated by class and ethnicity.  
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By the late 1990s, mosques and Islamic centers had been established in areas 
close to where most refugees lived and, as described in Chapter II, refugees and working-
class immigrants were diversifying their worship spaces to accommodate those who did 
not speak English and those who were interested in preserving regional traditions. 
Linguistic, class, and spatial barriers started to confound attempts at unity and mutual 
assistance. The multicultural mosques that early immigrant professionals had established, 
with their Friday sermons in English and locations in wealthier neighborhoods, distant 
from refugee housing, were inaccessible for most refugees. 
There was little organized, collective effort to welcome and support the 
newcomers; instead, some individuals in the know became points of contact and rallied 
support in cases of emergency. Ameera recalls that when word spread of a death or a 
disaster like a house fire, she and a handful of other individuals would check in with the 
family, gather money, and help with funeral arrangements. She recalled the time when a 
young Meskhetian Turkish woman died soon after arrival and a recent incident in which a 
Somali woman was struck by a train and killed. 
The main point of contact across class barriers during this period centered on 
buying plots of land in Louisville and southern Indiana where Muslims could be buried 
and raising funds for needy families to properly bury their dead. Community leaders 
struggled for many years to find affordable spaces where they could establish small 
Muslim-only graveyards, at times collaborating with groups in Bowling Green and 
southern Indiana. Many felt that a Muslim cemetery was as core of a need as a place to 
pray on Fridays and were mortified when they heard that some community members, 
including wealthy, religiously disengaged individuals, were buried in Christian 
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cemeteries. Part of their motivation for getting involved with cases of accidental death 
was to make sure that the deceased’s devastated low-income family could choose a 
proper burial arrangement. 
An early sign that Muslim donors were becoming more interested in local charity 
was changing patterns of giving during the Ramadan season and on Eid al-Fitr, the 
holiday that ends and celebrates the Ramadan fast. Traditionally, Muslims who are 
financially able give a gift of at minimum one day’s supply of food for one person to 
mark the last day of the holy month of Ramadan. This gift is called zakat al-fitr and is 
believed by many to be an obligation for all Muslims. When the Meskhetian Turks 
arrived in Louisville, one participant remembered that they wanted to give zakat al-fitr 
during their first Ramadan, despite their own position as new arrivals. Some ended up 
giving cash gifts to struggling Somali families. Similar events have taken place with Iraqi 
and Syrian families who insisted on giving regardless of their own financial 
circumstances. To not give would be admitting to their own poverty and need, which they 
are often too proud to do. The Ramadan season is also a popular season for distributing 
ṣadaqa, voluntary charity that can be given at any time and is believed to earn God’s 
favor. During the Ramadan season, giving often takes the form of large ifṭār dinners, 
symbolically important fast-breaking gatherings at the end of each day, or supplies meant 
for cooking family ifṭār. These large public ifṭār dinners are also often held as social 
gatherings at the mosques. 
Many Muslim immigrants in Louisville prefer to send money to charities working 
in other countries, usually countries with a Muslim majority, for their zakat al-fitr and 
ṣadaqa. This option is popular because many people believe that Muslims are less needy, 
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that “At least they have food stamps if they don't have jobs.” Others believe, or have 
started to believe, that giving to people who are closer is preferable. This has led to 
several organized giving projects in Louisville during Ramadan. These projects are not 
associated directly with a particular mosque or Islamic center, but are instead coordinated 
by social groups, especially of young people and women. Until recently, these projects 
involved little formal coordination and were not even official enough to have names. No 
one seems to remember when some people started calling the annual tradition of 
organizing boxes of sugar, oil, lentils, rice, and other basic foodstuffs to give to needy 
families during Ramadan “Sadaqa of Louisville”. Many still do not use the name, but 
they know that it happens each year and that members of the three largest Sunni mosques 
participate and suggest beneficiaries. Although nothing about this program specifically 
targets refugees, former refugees make up a large portion of the recipients. Project 
Downtown, an organization with a similar mission organized by young people and 
connected to a national nonprofit, eventually morphed into a charity aimed at helping 
local refugees before dissolving when the leader moved to a different state. 
Among local Shi’a, similar programs have emerged. A branch of the national 
organization “WhoIsHussein?” has distributed food at local homeless shelters and 
collected clothing donations during Ramadan. A member boasted that when they brought 
Iraqi food to the shelter, all the people there complimented the dishes and wanted to 
know if they could get similar food more often. Last year, they chose to target their 
giving to local refugee resettlement agencies, donating large amounts of clothing and 
household goods to Goodwill on KRM’s behalf. The largest Shi’a Islamic center also 
holds massive outdoor ifṭār meals and invites anyone who needs to eat. For Shi’a, the 
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month of Muharram in the Islamic calendar is also an important time because Hussein ibn 
‘Ali, who they recognize as the third leader of Muslims after the death of Prophet 
Muhammad, was killed in battle on the tenth day of that month. In recognition of the 
events leading to Hussein’s death, and as an outreach effort, Shi’a give both symbolic and 
substantial gifts in his honor. 
Prior to the arrival of the first Syrian refugees in Louisville, Muslims in Louisville 
were giving generously to charities for displaced Syrians abroad, especially during 
Ramadan. Widespread media coverage of the Syrian Civil War and the accounts spread 
by prominent Syrian-American community members about the dangers their relatives 
were facing meant that everyone knew something about the refugees. In addition, 
national and international Islamic aid organizations like Islamic Relief had taken to social 
media to advertise opportunities to send zakat al-fitr and ṣadaqa to the Syrian people. A 
group of Muslim youth, some still in high school, started an organization to raise money 
for Syria and held fundraising events. Narratives that encouraged Muslims to respond to 
the humanitarian crisis in Syria were heavily circulated far before the refugees arrived in 
Louisville and people were already scrambling for ways to respond. A few months before 
the Syrian refugees started to arrive, Aya, a Syrian-American teenager, wrote to KRM 
pleading for the agency to bring Syrians to Louisville. About two months later, she 
received a reply, explaining that, while local affiliates have little control over their 
refugee case allocation, KRM was expecting the first Syrian family to arrive in about a 
month. Aya and her family were ecstatic and started to spread the news. Thus was the 
stage set for the start of KRM’s Islamic Relief USA Grant, Syrian refugee resettlement in 
Louisville, and all of the changes that came with those two developments. 
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Islamic Relief Grant 
In 2013, after an event at the Muhammad Ali Center where representatives from 
KRM met a representative from IRUSA, the agency applied for and received a one-year 
grant aimed at engaging Louisville’s Muslim community in supporting refugee 
resettlement. The IRUSA representative had heard about KRM’s co-sponsorship program 
and was very excited about getting mosques involved. According to IRUSA’s publicly 
available tax return for 2013, the $52,000 grant’s purpose was to “create, train, and 
manage co-sponsorship teams to provide resettlement services for newly arrived 
refugees.” KRM staff members say that the indirect goal for IRUSA was to encourage 
Muslims to get involved in local charitable activities. 
In a moment that a staff member called “serendipitous or like divine 
intervention,” the grant started in January 2014 and the first Syrian refugee family arrived 
in Louisville about a month later, to great fanfare. The same staff member said, “It was a 
way for us to rally the Muslim Community… Okay we have these new Syrians who are 
coming and at that point… as far as KRM was concerned we needed them to be there in 
every way that they could.” Staff anticipated a challenging start to the new resettlement 
as there would be no established Syrian refugee community for newcomers to turn to and 
it was unclear if Syrians would be willing or able to build useful connections with Iraqis, 
the largest Arabic-speaking refugee community in Louisville.  
Under the auspices of the Islamic Relief grant, KRM organized a Muslim 
community donation drive and invited members of every local mosque to bring lightly 
used items to a central location. The response was massive – the drive collected 
truckloads of furniture, clothing, and home goods. Even the Shi’a Islamic center, which 
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no one had really expected to participate in a majority-Sunni event, sent a representative 
with several bags of clothing. One KRM staff member reflects, “I think that got people 
like really sort of hyped, like we need to organize… they can mobilize people, things, and 
money when they need to!” 
As more Syrians began to arrive, various Muslim groups planned their own 
donation drives and collected money and items to give directly to the new Syrians, in 
particular those who had timed out of KRM’s program or had needs that the resettlement 
agency couldn’t meet. For example, volunteers helped families who lost all the furniture 
that they had bought with their Resettlement and Placement money to bedbugs and were 
unable to replace it. Groups also identified less urgent but still important needs like 
additional blankets and warm clothing for refugees from southeastern Syria, where the 
temperature is much higher on average than in Louisville. One Islamic center became 
crowded with large items like furniture, which ended up causing a distribution problem. 
How could they bridge the physical disconnect between the Islamic center with eager, 
wealthy donors and relatively plentiful storage space in the East End and the refugees 
living in Buechel and the South End? Volunteers started to address this by transporting 
goods as needed to another Islamic center with less storage space but located closer to 
where the refugees live. 
At the same time, KRM staff were attempting to persuade mosques and Islamic 
centers to co-sponsor families. Co-sponsorship, as described previously, is a program in 
which a religious or community organization commits to help furnish a refugee family’s 
home before their arrival, pay part or all of their rent temporarily, help with transportation 
to appointments and childcare, and provide social connections to the greater community. 
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Until fairly recently, only churches in majority white areas had participated in KRM’s co-
sponsorship program. The co-sponsorship program, with its roots in church and 
synagogue sponsorship as early as the late 1940s, is in many ways not well suited to 
current Muslim religious organization in Louisville. As discussed previously, unlike 
churches in the US, mosques are generally considered only a place for prayer and 
religious instruction. While this is changing, for example, “Islamic center” implies a 
wider range of services and interests, the practice of “importing” imams from countries 
where places of worship and places that provide charity are usually separate means that 
the official source of religious authority often has little interest in using mosque space 
and funding for charitable work. Mosque executive boards, generally made up of older, 
first generation immigrants, often have similar opinions about the purpose of mosques. 
Previous efforts to engage Muslims in co-sponsorship failed because KRM employees 
used the same recruiting methods that worked for churches – they called the religious 
leader, assuming that imams and pastors or ministers played a similar role. More recent 
efforts have engaged with mosque attendees, some of whom were already doing 
volunteer work with KRM’s Youth Mentoring Program or the Cultural Exchange 
Program (a similar program catering to adults).  
In addition, co-sponsorship is generally seen as an agreement between a named, 
incorporated organization and KRM on behalf of a sponsored family. In almost all the 
Louisville cases of Muslims becoming involved in a co-sponsorship with KRM, members 
of the team were not all members of or exclusively involved with a single mosque or 
Islamic center. Team members had usually worked together in the past to organize 
charitable events and zakat or ṣadaqa distribution during Ramadan or had met in 
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women’s halaqa groups. They were simply groups of engaged community members 
pooling their own money and resources and using the name of a mosque or Islamic center 
to qualify as co-sponsors. This accounts for their almost universal hesitancy to sign an 
official co-sponsorship agreement, a phenomenon that could be frustrating for KRM staff 
because it made reporting rates of co-sponsorship difficult. For some, the standard 
monetary commitment seemed prohibitive, but the resettlement agency negotiated 
modified agreements to address their worries. This flexibility made co-sponsorship more 
appealing to Muslim groups. 
A group of Bosnians, mostly women, co-sponsored the first Syrian family, using 
donations from all the large mosques and Islamic centers in town. A Turkish group 
unofficially co-sponsored a family in the first year as well. A group of well-connected 
women at one East End mosque has helped or been in contact with every one of the 
seventy Syrian families resettled in Louisville in one way or another, as an official co-
sponsorship team, assisting another team, or providing unofficial help. This team, 
unsatisfied with the limitations that they felt that co-sponsorship imposed, took on a 
broader, less official role, following up with families as a group of “Arab representatives” 
and canvassing for additional aid on behalf of families whether or not they were still 
being helped by a resettlement agency. Both the Turkish group and this group of mostly 
Arab women assisted church co-sponsors who did not know much about Syria or Islam 
and wanted help with things like buying halal food, pronouncing unfamiliar names, and 
practicing basic greetings in Arabic to make families feel more welcome. On the arrival 




They had developed this system because they know the right places to go to 
where as soon as clients came they were able to get their phones switched over 
with the SIM cards exactly and they would still be able to have Arabic on their 
phones and it's funny because they come to the house, they would bring the guy to 
the house who would do it, so they had set up this system. No other co-sponsor 
could do that. 
 
Reflecting on the early period of their relationship with the resettlement agencies, one of 
these women remembered: 
KRM sponsored the first family and we were so happy and organizing all this 
stuff and, like, I swear, the stuff we put in their houses everything was new!... At 
the beginning, it was really good. At the beginning KRM and Catholic [Charities] 
were providing them so many things… Even with us when we co-sponsored 
families at the beginning it was like heaven honestly heaven! Better than now. 
 
As this quote implies, as time passed and more families arrived, conditions 
changed. On the agency side, some tensions developed with the unofficial co-sponsor-
like roles that Muslim community members were playing. Part of the goal of the co-
sponsorship program is to develop intercultural relationships that benefit both the 
assisting congregations and the participating families. People who would not otherwise 
meet refugees develop friendships that can lead to better cross-cultural understanding, 
create more welcoming communities, and solicit generous donations of time and money 
for the agency. A long-time KRM employee went so far as to say that sponsors often get 
more out of the program than the families they help. KRM and the church sponsor teams 
started to feel that Muslim volunteers were overstepping their proper role and making it 
difficult for the church teams to develop relationships with the families they were 
sponsoring: 
Sometimes folks from the mosque would come to the airport arrival because they 
wanted to be there and meet them at the airport. Well, how odd is that because 
you want them to meet their co-sponsors but then these other folks are here who 




What’s more, KRM had set a precedent that employees would later regret – the agency 
had been notifying Muslim community leaders when new Syrian families arrived. At the 
beginning, this seemed reasonable. There was no established Syrian refugee community 
and arrivals were coming slowly, so families would not have the benefit of meeting other 
Syrian refugee families in English class or at the Arab grocery stores. Calling Muslim 
leaders meant connecting the newcomers with a group of Arab immigrant families who 
were eager to help, putting them at ease. This move, however, was directly counter to 
humanitarian ethical standards of impartiality and privacy. No other group gets called 
every time a new arrival of a certain nationality or religious background arrives, so as the 
community in Louisville began to grow and refugees were better able to meet each other 
on an everyday basis, this practice seemed unnecessary at best and invasive at worst. 
What if a family that did not want anything to do with the Islamic centers arrived? 
Caseworkers were also becoming worried because they were noticing what they 
see as unhealthy or troublesome co-sponsor behaviors. Co-sponsors often try to take on 
responsibilities that are beyond their mandate and, in KRM staff’s opinion, are better left 
either to the casework staff or to the refugees themselves. One staff member called this a 
“cradle to the grave” mentality, the feeling that the family’s success is completely in your 
hands as the co-sponsor and that you have a responsibility to be their caseworker, their 
parent, their best friend, and everything in between until they meet your standard of 
success. KRM’s institutional understanding of how refugee adaptation works holds that 
refugees are resilient enough to succeed on their own given time and connection to peer 
groups. Although they feel that a good co-sponsorship should end in a long-term, 
respectful relationship, they think that an overly active co-sponsor encourages 
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dependency and makes it difficult for refugees to achieve the programmatic ideal of self-
sufficiency. It also leads to co-sponsor stress and burn out. Because of these factors, staff 
believed that the relationship that KRM had shared with members of the Muslim 
community would have to change. 
At the same time, volunteers started to hear about and witness significant 
deficiencies in refugees’ housing. Several families experienced pest infestations that 
landlords failed to address. One volunteer joked that some families had a competition to 
see who could catch the most mice. In one case, KRM found a rental house for a 
reasonable price to house a family with mosque co-sponsors. When the co-sponsorship 
team entered the home, they were disgusted; it was filthy and bug-infested and the front 
door was off its hinges. The team spent two days cleaning every inch of the house and 
spraying for bugs, only rushing to move in furniture at the very last minute. One of the 
helpers remembers, “in our tradition we take off our shoes but I couldn't even take my 
shoes off in that house.” The volunteers felt that if refugees moved closer to the Islamic 
centers and wealthy donors in the East End, housing quality would be better and it would 
be easier for them to support the new arrivals. Representatives from the most active 
Muslim groups approached KRM to try to persuade the agency to rent apartments in the 
East End, arguing that they were closer to the most supportive mosques, cleaner, and 
safer. A staff member who was involved in the discussion recounted her interpretation of 
what happened next: 
I actually went with them to a few apartment complexes and… the landlords have 
to agree to accept clients without social security and a job and credit and all that 





The lesson she believed that the volunteers took away was that good housing with access 
to public transportation is difficult to find without a credit history or proof of income. A 
conversation with one of the involved representatives tells a different story. He sees 
landlords’ unwillingness to consider refugee applicants as a form of anti-immigrant and 
classist housing discrimination that needs to be addressed legally. He found KRM staff’s 
apparent sympathy for such landlords infuriating. 
 After this incident, housing continued to be a challenge and a point of contention 
between KRM and Muslim community volunteers. Two disputes in particular came up in 
nearly every interview. The first was the case of two young brothers, one of whom had 
lost both of his legs in a bomb attack. Prior to their arrival, KRM had searched for an 
accessible housing complex for them to live in with little success. Finally, a landlord 
agreed to make modifications to an apartment to make it wheelchair-accessible. On the 
brothers’ arrival, however, the changes were not complete. For weeks, the landlord 
continued to delay, forcing one brother to lift the other up and down stairs whenever he 
wanted to leave and carry him in and out of a tiny bathroom. While KRM hoped to stick 
with the complex because housing staff were having trouble finding an alternative, 
community volunteers were horrified by the situation. They demanded new 
accommodations and, when staff told them that they were trying but that it might take 
time, the volunteers put the brothers up in an extended stay hotel. They then found an 
accessible apartment in the East End (close to the mosque) and co-signed the lease so that 
they could move them there. One of the brothers related his frustration with the whole 
incident, “It's injustice to put someone who's in a wheelchair in a small and bad area, so I 
forget about the bad area, but the restroom! Any one of us has to use the restroom!” 
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Although this case was the one that respondents described most commonly, it was 
only one of many cases, according to volunteers and refugees, in which the resettlement 
agencies were unable to place families with special medical needs in appropriate housing. 
Syrian refugees coming to Louisville have intensive medical needs at a particularly high 
rate as compared to other groups and volunteers and refugees report that, as in the 
brothers’ case, many refugees with disabled family members have ended up in 
apartments with accessibility issues. In another case, a family with an adult child who has 
severe intellectual and developmental disabilities and cannot walk was placed in an 
apartment with stairs. The parents were only able to move the child in and out of the 
apartment with significant difficulty. 
 The second incident involved a Kurdish family, a widow with several children, 
that experienced horrifying harassment from neighborhood teens. Children in the family 
were physically bullied while playing outside. On multiple occasions, rocks were thrown 
through their windows. When they called the police, officers arrived, but said that they 
couldn’t do anything since no one could prove who had thrown the rocks. Hearing that 
the mother and children were so scared at night that they could barely sleep and the 
youngest child had started wetting the bed, two prominent Muslim volunteers started 
sleeping at the apartment on alternating nights to help them feel safer. KRM worked with 
a local church to host a community meeting, hoping to introduce refugee families to the 
neighborhood and end the incidents without severing ties with the apartment complex. 
Understandably, the family still didn’t feel safe and wanted to move, but they had already 
signed a lease and KRM staff advised them not to break it because of the cost. Turkish 
community members took up the family’s cause and raised enough money to move them 
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to a new complex, paying all the necessary fees and moving costs and even cosigning 
their lease so that they could move into a nicer apartment. 
 The volunteers who worked with these cases are still annoyed that community 
intervention was necessary to fix things that, in their view, should have been quickly and 
easily resolved by KRM’s caseworkers. At the same time, they are proud that they took a 
stand and firmly believe that their advocacy on behalf of refugee clients is a necessary 
check on the resettlement agency’s authority. Some KRM staff on the other hand felt that, 
in cases like these, volunteers once again overstepped their boundaries. Staff prioritize 
their relationships with landlords even when they are slow to respond to maintenance 
requests or spray for pests with the understanding that housing conditions in low income 
areas are often poor and landlords who will rent to refugees are scarce, so they must rent 
with the same landlords repeatedly. They strongly discourage refugee clients from 
breaking a lease because the client must pay for the move, including a new security 
deposit, penalty fees, and other expenses, and landlords become less willing to rent to 
KRM when refugees leave before the lease is over. By removing the financial barriers to 
moving, Muslim volunteers had empowered these refugees to make a decision that was 
against the long-term interests of the resettlement agency. 
 Amid these conflicts over housing conditions and Muslim community 
interventions, the relationship between KRM and these community groups changed in 
ways that frustrated community members. KRM stopped informing Muslim leaders when 
a new Syrian family arrived and became less willing to communicate with the most active 
Muslim volunteers about cases, even when refugees requested their help as mediators 
with the casework team. In the context of contemporary events, this policy change 
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appeared to be a punitive measure aimed at shutting out whistleblowers. Rumors started 
to fly and mistrust started to develop, with community members unable to understand 
what had happened or why the level of communication had changed. 
Eventually, KRM called a meeting with local leaders to discuss the change and 
why staff felt that it was necessary. Those who attended the meeting can easily recite the 
talking points that they heard – privacy is important, there are many refugees and limited 
resources, KRM and the co-sponsor’s roles are very limited, KRM has primary 
responsibility for many aspects of each case – but they do not necessarily understand 
what they mean in practice or within what institutional constraints staff are working. 
Many still feel betrayed or disappointed, often on a personal level because they had 
developed close working relationships with individual staff members. One volunteer 
recalled with nostalgia how she and some friends spent afternoons working in the KRM 
warehouse with one staff member, “we would go help her even organize the stuff you 
know as friends.” Another laughed at how two staff members called her, using their 
personal, not work, numbers, every hour or so as a family’s flight was progressively 
delayed later and later until their final arrival time had moved from 9pm to 1am. Being 
told that that personal connection was merely professional was deeply saddening for 
these volunteers. 
Instead of modifying the quantity of work they were doing, these groups started to 
depend less on KRM for information about new families. Newer families were often 
related to families who were already in Louisville and, if not, they met other Syrians in 
social services offices or in English classrooms. One of the volunteers started a Whatsapp 
group to connect Syrians with each other and locate new families and families with 
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urgent needs. They took up more of the advocacy role when dealing with the agency, 
communicating challenges that refugees were having and needs that long-term clients 
had. At times, this has been more collaborative and at times it has been more 
oppositional. On some occasions, an older woman from the community has come into the 
office to air clients’ grievances and communicate rumors in a casual way. Caseworkers 
could then respond to complaints that the clients might not feel comfortable saying on 
their own. On the more oppositional end of the spectrum, some Islamic center members 
have escalated arguments over casework details that individual staff members cannot 
control into larger conflicts that frustrate busy staff. 
The conflicts between KRM and Muslim community groups are rooted in 
different models of refugee assistance that are negotiated internally as well as externally 
in relations with other charitable organizations and the greater community. KRM’s 
institutional origin myth starts with a single woman working at her kitchen table with a 
compassionate heart and a strong work ethic. The office culture emphasizes personal 
connections forged between staff members as well as clients, the “KRM family.” At the 
same time, the agency now has offices in both Lexington and Louisville, employs over 90 
people, many of whom are professional social workers, and is one of the largest 
resettlement agency affiliates in the US. Reminiscing about the transition from less than 5 
employees to over 90 and the increasing numbers of refugee arrivals that came along with 
that, one employee says, “You lose that personal touch.” The agency has professionalized 
over the years and, in doing so, has become more concerned with issues like privacy, 
impartiality, the maintenance of professional boundaries, and meeting agency, as opposed 
to individual refugee goals. 
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Being flexible and trying to meet many individual client needs can sometimes run 
counter to this professional model, leading to internal ethical conflicts or strange 
incongruities in service provision from an outsider perspective. For example, volunteers 
often feel that staff reactions to housing problems are incongruous with the severity of the 
situation. Staff on the other hand feel misunderstood; they try to react with 
professionalism and compassion, but a roach infestation, for example, seems like less of 
an emergency when you have resolved a similar situation many times before. In these 
cases, the warm concerned friend and the cool professional staff member who does not 
make badgering a neglectful landlord his or her top priority and urges a client to stay in 
poor housing are the same person. Incorporating aspects of a caring personal relationship 
into the professional relationship of casework is integral to KRM’s institutional self-
image and yet what staff members do is a job, with all the behavioral constraints that 
come with that, and part of that job is to secure the continuity of the refugee resettlement 
program in Louisville. 
Muslim volunteers have built their aid model on truly close, personal connections 
as opposed to cordial professional connections under the shadow of program compliance. 
In contrasting their willingness to ask for help or rely on KRM or the Muslim 
community, interviewed refugees said that they trusted the resettlement agency and the 
refugee program in general because they had to. When I prompted them, they said that 
they had no choice but to trust because the agency had so much control over their social 
services and they were thankful that most staff members did a good job, even if there 
were some bad apples. Their trust for Muslim community members was less tentative. 
One refugee said with no hesitation that if he needed help, he would go straight to his 
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friends from the Muslim community or his volunteer English tutor and he would not 
bother with anyone else, “I have enough people.” Many refugees and the volunteers who 
helped them described each other with kinship terms beyond those normally used in 
Muslim circles. Describing one particularly active volunteer, a young Syrian man said, 
“She's our mother.” When a young Syrian Kurdish mother visited during a volunteer 
meeting, Ameera greeted her and her baby with hugs and kisses and introduced her as her 
daughter. A refugee woman explained the need for these close connections, saying that 
Syrians who come without their extended family must rely on the Arab community as 
their kin. These fictive kin references can be patronizing at times, for example, when one 
volunteer described the refugees as like the community’s children because they could do 
so little on their own upon arrival. Still, despite the implied power gap between “parent” 
and “child”, refugees value the close bond that these terms imply and this strengthens the 
ability of Muslim volunteer groups to identify needs and address them.  
Often only affiliated with a religious organization in name and thus independent 
from many institutional constraints, the groups of Muslim volunteers that have been most 
active have relative freedom to allocate funds and donations in any way they choose. This 
should not imply that they work under no constraints or that what they do is somehow 
easier; not being incorporated or grant-funded carries significant risk. They are at the 
mercy of donors and must constantly fight against compassion fatigue as the Syrian civil 
war rages on and refugees continue to arrive. They make significant sacrifices of time 
and capital. One long-time supporter is currently the cosigner on six refugees’ leases, a 
risky arrangement that would be impossible in an institutional setting, but has allowed 
those families to secure superior housing despite the structural constraints that push 
75
 
refugees into poor conditions. To facilitate a Saturday tutoring program for refugee 
children, a loosely organized group of Turkish volunteers drives upwards of thirty 
participants in their personal cars every week. Most nonprofit organizations would 
discount these methods as unsustainable or legally dangerous. What if multiple families 
were unable to pay rent? What if someone crashed their car and an angry parent blamed 
the tutoring program organizer? Informality gives these groups the power to respond to 
and advocate on behalf of refugee needs in more flexible ways if they accept these sorts 
of risks. 
Muslim volunteer groups in Louisville are now experimenting with more 
formalized organizational structures, but these structures still incorporate a great deal of 
flexibility. The most engaged Islamic center has a “refugee committee”, a group of three 
women and two men, all of whom are senior Arab community members, who meet as 
needed to distribute financial aid out of donations for refugees that are given to the 
center. Either refugees ask for assistance directly through a volunteer or the imam or 
word spreads that a family is in need and one of several “trusted families” reports that 
need to the committee. These trusted families are generally early arrivals and the 
volunteer group that is most directly affiliated with the committee has identified a few of 
them from each highway exit on the Watterson Expressway, the route that they take to 
visit them. In interviews, this group often referred to “a family off of exit 10” or “the 
apartments near exit 9”. They use the exits as units for needs assessment in the field and 
this function carries over to the refugee committee. Committee members vote on how 
money should be allocated, providing discretionary assistance for everything from rent 
payments to washing machines. Although the committee’s decisions could become 
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suspect in the long term, so far, they have gone unquestioned, possibly due to the 
inclusion of the imam in the decision-making process. 
Institutional models of refugee adaptation, as discussed earlier, hold that clients 
should be doing things independently as early as possible; for example, they should be 
taking the bus to doctor’s appointments instead of getting rides every time if they hope to 
become self-sufficient. On the other hand, KRM endorses support networks within 
refugee and ethnic communities like carpools and ethnic community-based organizations. 
In that sense, many of the volunteer groups fall into a gray zone that challenges the 
boundaries between donor groups and ethnic community groups. Until the Syrian 
arrivals, ethnic community-based organizations that KRM had worked with had small 
budgets and limited resources that made it difficult for them to provide significant 
material aid. They could not fit into any official role in casework, but they could guide 
the resettlement agency on certain issues and assist refugees without the involvement of 
the resettlement agency. Co-sponsors, on the other hand, can provide a great deal of 
material aid, but linguistic and cultural barriers generally bound their ability to 
incorporate refugees into their larger social community. Still, they have an official role in 
refugee cases that entitles them to a different level of access for their sponsored cases. 
How then should a co-sponsor team in which most participants are Syrians or Arabs 
helping a Syrian Arab family be bounded ethically? Or a Turkish group with many 
Kurdish members helping a Syrian Kurdish family? What about the unofficial co-
sponsorships with no paperwork signed and no official agreement? When these groups 
get involved beyond the bounds of co-sponsorship, is this dangerous over-dependency or 
ethnic community empowerment? In the end, KRM staff decided that professional 
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impartiality required treating Muslim co-sponsors like any other co-sponsor team and 
encouraging them to maintain a degree of distance. Also consistent with previous policy, 
when there was no agreed upon co-sponsorship, groups would be treated like any other 
community group and a special relationship would not be developed. 
Most Muslim helpers believe that they are obligated as community members to 
assist refugees who communicate their inability to do something. They believe that, 
without this community intervention, the refugees in question would be incapable of 
functioning independently in such an unfamiliar and confusing setting with no family. 
Many referred repeatedly in interviews to the refugees’ lack of education and rural 
upbringing and how, if they were not instructed on the correct way of living in the US, 
they would not only fail to adapt but they would reflect poorly on the Syrian, Arab, and 
Muslim communities in general. While a lack of faith in refugees’ capabilities is typical 
of co-sponsors, the fear that failure would mean a blemished reputation is not. In 
addition, these volunteers had a far more developed sense of what long-term success 
would look like, forged from the stories and rumors discussed in Chapter II. Syrians, they 
had decided, must become integrated into the Arab Muslim community and, in order to 
represent that community well, they must move as quickly as possible to good housing 
and enroll young people in higher education in order to produce a generation of educated 
professionals. 
 In conclusion, rapid changes under the IRUSA grant and in its wake birthed novel 
patterns of Muslim community engagement in the resettlement of Syrian refugees. This 
aid surprised KRM staff both in its scale and the tensions that it caused. The clash 
between KRM’s professional model of refugee service provision and Muslim 
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communities’ less formal and more flexible approach highlights the strengths and 
limitations of both models. The Sunni Muslim groups that are most engaged in assistance 
for Syrian refugees have the connections and motivation to move massive stores of 
material resources and distribute them without significant restrictions. The advantages of 
a strong relationship are clear for KRM, with its restricted budget and large caseload and 
for Muslim groups, who have a vested interest in the quality of formal resettlement 
services. Yet there are aspects of the professional model, like workplace boundaries and 
programmatic requirements, that KRM cannot compromise for the benefit of a 
community relationship. The challenge facing both groups is to come to a mutual 
understanding and maintain a level of respect for their respective attempts at meeting 
their goals. This must start with a recognition that, although they share the goal of 
integrating refugees into the local community as productive citizens with a degree of 
independence, Muslim community standards of success reflect belief in more ambitious 
futures in which Syrians beat the odds and experience significant upward mobility, 
enhancing their reputation. The next chapter explores these beliefs in more detail through 
the lens of developing solidarities and Syrian refugees’ symbolic place in the Muslim 





EMERGING COMMUNITIES AND VOLUNTARY ASSISTANCE 
 
 Aya, the young, Syrian-American volunteer who had called the meeting to plan a 
public Syrian cultural and fundraising event made it clear – one of the main purposes of 
the event would be to introduce Syrian culture to Americans, so absolutely no politics 
allowed! There would be pictures of a beautiful pre-war Syria, delicious food, 
calligraphy, a henna artist, a photo booth with colorful hijabs and ornamented thobes, and 
no mention of the war or Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad. When I arrived to help set up 
the event, everything seemed as neutral and nostalgic as planned, except a few pieces of 
art for sale propped up for display on a bed of cloth. Labelled “art by Syrian orphans”, all 
but one piece depicted scenes of government tanks and airplanes, men in fatigues firing 
guns, and victims bleeding profusely in a disturbingly colorful childish style. When one 
of the organizers arrived, she immediately protested the arrangement, moving the more 
violent scenes to the back and bringing the other painting, a childish attempt at 
calligraphy, to the front. Even in their new, less visible location, every painting was sold 
after two hours. 
At first, the links that Muslim community members share with Syrian refugees 
seem obvious. The Syrian refugees who have been resettled in Louisville are majority 
Sunni Muslim and Arab. There is a large Sunni Arab community in Louisville. There is a 
significant Syrian Kurdish minority among the refugees. There are a number of Sunni 
80
 
Kurdish families in Louisville from Turkey, Iraq, and Syria. Most Muslims in Louisville 
are immigrants or refugees or the children of immigrants or refugees. When one starts to 
explore beyond these national and ethnic affiliations, however, the story becomes more 
complicated and “cultural proximity” starts to seem like a more and more distant ideal. 
Volunteers and refugees have little in common beyond their national origins. The story of 
Muslim faith-based volunteer work with the Syrian refugees is not merely one of a 
national or ethnic community’s inevitable merger or one of simple, selfless altruism. 
Instead, this work is better understood as part of a constant negotiation that seeks to 
reconfigure communal linkages and come to terms with new public perceptions of group 
members. Although Muslim volunteer groups struggle to project humanitarian neutrality, 
bill the Syrian refugee crisis as a purely human rights issue, and package a nostalgic, 
depoliticized Syrian nationalism, this ideal has been repeatedly torn from their grasp. 
Mobilizing under the umbrella of Islam does not erase the significant diversity within the 
so-called “Muslim community” and the way in which groups bound their membership 
and prioritize their objects of aid is highly contextual and fluid, not strictly impartial. At 
times, modes of aid distribution highlight tensions between Muslim groups from different 
national, ethnic, and class backgrounds and problematize simplistic ideas of community. 
Working to assist Syrian refugees links local Muslims to nationalist politics in the US and 
abroad, US immigration debates, and city-wide interfaith networks. This chapter explores 
how Muslim communities’ organizing and volunteer work around the Syrian refugee 
crisis incorporates ideas of belonging at international, national, and local scales and how 
this has led to unlikely solidarities across class, national, and ethnic divisions. 
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For many immigrant Muslims, interest in the Syrian refugees is part of active 
transnational involvement in their county of origin’s politics as well as a sense of national 
pride that links their actions to their countrymen’s reputation. In the case of former 
immigrants whose countries of origin currently host Syrian refugees, helping the Syrians 
shows solidarity with their family and friends who are experiencing the challenges caused 
by the refugee crisis in the Middle East. Jordanian- and Lebanese-American immigrant 
professionals and their families, for example, have been among the most active 
volunteers. This motivation is especially meaningful for Turkish-Americans in 
Louisville, who often made reference in interviews to the large number of Syrians in 
Turkey and the support that the Turkish people have provided. This was a key factor in 
local Turks’ decision to co-sponsor a family with KRM, “We have more than two million 
refugees in Turkey, Turkish people are doing this so we should do this here.” Previously 
unfamiliar with the average refugee allocations that the US allows each year, they were 
shocked and disappointed to find out that President Obama was increasing the arrival cap 
to only 110,000 individuals and that this increase was receiving major pushback from 
many politicians. Comparing this to Turkey, one related: 
We just opened the doors because if you don't open the doors they will be killed, 
and I'm not saying we had very solid refugee plans no we don't and maybe 
hundreds of thousands of Syrian kids they cannot go to school in Turkey, really 
because we don't have schools enough, but at least they are safe, nobody's 
bombing them, you know? 
 
Many Turkish-Americans feel that this state of affairs makes them especially obligated to 
help Syrians in exile. 
 The large number of refugees in Turkey also link Turks to the Syrians in other 
ways. Many refugees coming to Louisville lived in exile in Turkey for many years. Some 
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refugees said that they had sought out Turks in Louisville because they could not speak 
English well, but they could speak Turkish. Among those who had fled to Turkey, a large 
number had previously lived near the Turkish border and often used the Turkish language 
or interacted with ethnic Turks and ethnic Kurds from the other side of the border. Before 
the Ottoman Empire dissolved and, following the borders drawn in the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement, the League of Nations created a French Mandate in Syria in 1920, movement 
across what is now the border was even more common, meaning that people from this 
region have shared ancestry and cultural heritage. During my fieldwork, I witnessed 
instances of Syrian and Iraqi Arabs using Turkish to communicate with Syrian Kurds, 
whose Arabic is often not very strong. Some Kurds from northern Syria feel that they 
have more in common culturally with Turkish people than with Syrian Arabs. A small 
cohort of Syrian Kurds often attends public events at the local Turkish center and 
worships there on Fridays. 
Organizing around Kurdish ethnicity and Kurdish nationalism seems to create 
additional links of social obligation with the Syrians. Ercan, a leader in the local Turkish 
community, estimates that a little less than half of the Turkish immigrants in Louisville 
are Kurds. Reflecting on his experience of growing up Kurdish during a time when fear 
of militant Kurdish nationalists was at its height and Kurdish language was outlawed, he 
commented that, “I don’t feel like I am in my country in Turkey.” Compared to his 
experiences before, he feels more comfortable with his Kurdish heritage and passing 
down language and traditions to his children in the US. Unlike in Turkey, it is safe to 
organize around Kurdish ethnicity and national pride. Kurds in Louisville already knew 
each other when the Syrians started to arrive and checked in with each other regularly. 
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When the Kurdish widow who the Turkish community later helped to move out of a 
challenging housing situation arrived, Ercan’s wife heard about her from a friend and she 
and a couple of other women went to visit and see how the family was doing. He and his 
wife felt that, as fellow Kurds, they were obligated to help welcome her. 
The Syrian-American response to Syrian refugees is, as should be expected, 
highly complex and expresses the mixed emotions that the Syrian conflict has caused for 
those who maintain a nostalgic Syrian nationalism from afar. Given the opportunity to 
speak as one of several faith leaders at a pro-refugee rally in Frankfort, a Syrian imam 
spoke at length about how Syria had hosted refugees from Armenia, Palestine, and Iraq 
and treated them with courtesy and kindness. Should not the international community, he 
argued, return that favor to the Syrians who are fleeing war? Unlike the other religious 
leaders, who talked about faith-based guidance that encourages welcoming refugees, he 
spoke from his experience as a Syrian national and made an argument that celebrated the 
Syrian nation’s past generosity in a nostalgic manner. The crowd’s muted reaction 
demonstrated that this argument was not very relatable for the activists in attendance; 
they expected religious discourse but instead heard a type of political discourse to which 
they could not relate. While most Americans knew little about Syria before the recent 
conflict, Syrian-Americans and immigrants from other Arab nations remember when 
Syria was stable and relatively prosperous. This has led to a frustrating situation in which 
Americans who they encounter in everyday life imagine a Syria defined by war. 
Redefining Syria’s image while still emphasizing the severity of the humanitarian crisis 
there has thus become part of their goal for assisting Syrian refugees. 
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As far as many of the Syrian professional immigrants are concerned, however, the 
refugees do not make this an easy task. The average Syrian in Louisville before the 
refugees started to come was highly educated, wealthy, and originally urban, while the 
average Syrian refugee in Louisville has a low level of education and comes from a rural 
or small town, working class or agricultural background. The very existence of Syrians 
like this undermines the national image for which the professional immigrants strive. One 
of the most active Syrian-American helpers aired her frustration with the average level of 
education among Syrian arrivals: 
They're giving [us a] bad reputation like, ok, you have to understand… it doesn't 
have to be about religion or the countryside or anything, wherever there are low-
educated people, whoever they are, they are going to be a little bit dumb, right? 
And they're going to give a low reputation to whoever they are. So now when 
you're giving me sixty-nine families, most of them with a very bad reputation, you 
are going to ruin the reputation of whoever is here before and that's why 
whenever they would tell me, “Yeah, we have Syrian refugees and they don't 
know how to, even Arabic, they don't know how to write at all,” like these are the 
exception, I swear! I swear! I have a huge family in Syria and my husband has a 
huge family. We're not related, me and my husband are not related, ok? We have 
two huge families in Syria, two separate ones. None of us are illiterate, I swear! 
They won't understand that there are educated, college people there. 
 
This quote encapsulates common Syrian immigrant sentiment towards the refugees. The 
volunteer names or implies several traits of the Syrian refugees that she feels reflect 
poorly on the “educated college people”. The first and most important in her view is their 
lack of education and, in some cases, illiteracy. In her experience, Syrian people are 
mostly highly educated, which demonstrates their intelligence. Earlier in the interview, 
she complained that she had always told her children about how educated Syrian people 
were and, when the refugees came, they were confused and asked her what happened. 
How could these people who could not even write in Arabic come from the same country 
she had described? Her last comment about not being related to her husband is a 
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reference to first cousin marriage, a practice that was once common in many Arab 
communities, but now carries a stigma outside of rural areas. This is not a random 
reference, but commentary on the fact that many of the Syrian adults who have arrived in 
Louisville are from areas where the traditional practice is still considered acceptable and 
a few married couples are first cousins. These traits, she and other Arab professional 
immigrants agree, perpetuate harmful stereotypes about the Middle East and reflect 
poorly on other Arabs. 
These prejudices extend beyond the helpers. A Syrian asylee from a wealthy 
family expressed similar confusion at the low level of education in the Syrian refugee 
community, explaining that Syria has free public education and it is possible to work and 
go to school. When I asked her why she thought that so few of the refugees had attended 
secondary school, she shrugged and said that they must not have wanted to do it. In the 
idealized Syria, there are no barriers to education and lacking a diploma or college degree 
is inexcusable. It seems that these stereotypes and justifications lay bare structural 
inequalities in Syria that do not fit neatly into the Syrian nationalism that upper class 
Syrians have constructed. With the arrival of working class Syrians in Louisville, they 
can no longer completely deny their existence and this threatens to destabilize their 
deeply held beliefs about the social order in pre-war Syria. 
 Charity is a key part of giving materiality to Syrian nationalism in exile. In order 
to maintain national pride and the charitable order of things, the refugees must become 
model citizens. They must become integrated into reputable parts of the community and 
achieve high levels of education. They must, like other model refugees before them, 
move out of poor neighborhoods and experience social mobility. Any less would be 
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wrong because Syrians are well-educated and hardworking people. In honor of this ideal, 
the community must come together to lift them up with social guidance and financial 
support. There is a special focus on young people in this regard, because they are more 
likely to be able to attend a university and some community members say that they are 
more likely to change “backwards” beliefs with good mentorship. Volunteers take special 
pride in the young adults who are already attending technical school and who they hope 
will elevate Syrians’ reputation in the future. 
 The conflict in Syria itself is also a deeply meaningful issue both politically and 
personally and the act of helping refugees, even if they are not the sort of people with 
whom one would normally fraternize, is a charitable, religious, and political act. Syrian-
Americans almost universally have family and friends who have been directly impacted 
by the war; they know people who are now political prisoners, people who are under 
daily threats of bombing, people who have fled to various parts of Europe and the Middle 
East, people who have lost their lives. Sunni Syrian-Americans are more likely to have 
friends and family who supported the rebel cause and suffered because of it. Although the 
conflict in Syria is not strictly sectarian, it does have some sectarian elements, as the 
membership of anti-Assad rebel groups is mostly Sunni and members of the Alawite 
religious minority and various Shi’a militant groups have bolstered the pro-Assad loyalist 
movement. Giving assistance to Syrian refugees and condemning the bombing of 
civilians is an effective indirect way to show support for the rebellion against Assad. The 
Syrians who have come to Louisville, often witnesses to government atrocities and 
generalized violence, are symbolic martyrs for the cause. 
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 These political issues have been muted in most public settings, but often come up 
in conversation and debate about organizing approaches. Leaders of Muslim volunteer 
groups agree that political rhetoric and open references to human rights abuses by the 
Syrian government should not be part of fundraising events or public outreach targeted to 
Americans. Young volunteers, who are more open about their political leanings, attribute 
this hesitance from their immigrant parents to coming of age in countries where speaking 
openly about your political beliefs could lead to detention. According to community 
leaders, these subjects are off-putting and improper in the context of charitable planning 
and community engagement and it is better to focus on refugees’ needs independent of 
their pre-migration experiences. 
It is likely that common practice around charity in the Muslim tradition also 
contributes to the silencing of political motivations. It is believed that charity, especially 
aid provided in a religious context, should be given for the sake of God, not for personal 
reasons, and should be concealed from the public if possible. This is referenced in several 
parts of the Qur’an, with the most explicit verses stating, “If you give charity openly, it is 
good, but if you keep it secret and give to the needy in private, that is better for you… 
Whatever charity you give benefits your own soul, provided you do it for the sake of 
God” (Qur’an 2:271-272, trans. M.A.S. Abdel Haleem). Traditionally, the ideal form of 
zakat or ṣadaqa is an anonymous monetary gift. For example, one year in the early 2000s, 
a Pakistani doctor anonymously paid for Christmas gifts for every refugee child served 
by KRM. Group donations or volunteer work do not make anonymity easy, but, even in 
these cases, admitting personal investment in one’s philanthropy expresses motivations 
beyond faith in God. Yet, how can these personal and political issues be properly 
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separated from responses to the refugee crisis? Like the graphic paintings by Syrian 
orphans described at the beginning of the chapter, political motivations are present and 
not well hidden, but remain unspoken and little advertised. Here, Arab Muslim groups 
face the same challenges as formalized NGOs as they attempt to project impartiality and 
neutrality to attract a broader base of support and satisfy ethical qualms. 
 On the level of US national politics, there are even more issues that create 
unlikely solidarities around refugee resettlement. In the years leading up to the first 
Syrian refugees arriving in Louisville, the Syrian civil war received a great deal of media 
attention and international aid organizations oversaw massive fundraising and public 
awareness campaigns for displaced Syrians. The migrant crisis in Europe also received 
press in the US, including pervasive debates about Muslim integration and the possibility 
of Islamic State militants entering the EU among Syrian refugees. After the November 
2015 Paris attacks, Republican politicians sparked a public debate that questioned the 
safety of the US refugee program. The Paris attacks were a series of fatal assaults 
coordinated by Islamic State militants who investigators believed had entered France 
using fake passports amongst a group of undocumented immigrants and refugees. Could 
refugees from conflict zones like Syria, some politicians argued, be properly vetted using 
the current security checks? Questions of refugee security quickly led to commentary 
from the many presidential candidates who were in the process of campaigning at the 
time. Donald Trump in particular sparked controversy when, in the weeks after the 
attacks in Paris, he voiced support for and then retracted statements on a national 
“Muslim registry” (New York Times, 20 Nov 2015, A1). Later, he opined at a rally that a 
database of Syrian refugees in the US should be created and that certain mosques should 
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be surveilled (New York Times, 21 Nov 2015, A24). Letters to the editor published in The 
Courier Journal, Louisville’s local newspaper, just days after the Paris attack reveal the 
rapid developments in the national and local conversation. One letter reads, “It is the 
height of naivete to think ISIS would miss a chance to infiltrate the U.S. among the 
refugees” (The Courier Journal, 18 Nov 2015, Opinion). Another Louisvillian wrote, 
“We do not need more mouths to feed, Or the danger they bring with them. Worry about 
the people of Kentucky” (The Courier Journal, 19 Nov 2015, Rants and Raves). 
Although their arguments often targeted the refugee program in general, critics of 
US refugee resettlement following the Paris attacks were specifically concerned, like 
their European counterparts, with Muslim integration and the specter of Islamic 
extremism. In another letter to the editor, a local woman extended a hypothetical scenario 
in which a Syrian family arrives in Louisville and, twenty years later, young family 
members “become radicalized” and bomb the KFC Yum Center. “No amount of vetting 
in the world could have predicted this. It's not worth the risk,” she concludes (The 
Courier-Journal, 18 Nov 2015, Opinion). Through these public conversations, refugee 
resettlement was increasingly linked to the fear of Muslim “infiltration” in the US; in 
short, refugee resettlement became highly politicized. On both sides of the debate, 
refugee, Syrian, and Muslim became linked categories in a way that they had not been 
previously. On a local and interpersonal scale, this eliding of categories had significant 
consequences. A Palestinian doctor remembers that a coworker asked her if she was 
Syrian because she was wearing a hijab. Muslim refugees, who had often reported 
discrimination in the past, experienced more blatant instances of Islamophobic street 
harassment. Supporters of refugee resettlement donated generously to both local 
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resettlement agencies and to local mosques and Islamic centers, some of which had never 
distributed monetary gifts and had never been connected with the Syrian refugees on an 
institutional level. The assumption that members of these three groups were strongly 
linked or one and the same dragged into the fray people who might never have paid 
attention to the Syrian refugee population in Louisville otherwise. 
These political and social links became stronger after President Trump was 
elected and, as one of his first acts in office, instituted Executive Order 13769, titled 
“Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States.” This order 
temporarily suspended all refugee arrivals pending a review of the security screening 
process and barred entry to the US for all nationals of seven Muslim-majority countries 
that had been previously denied access to the US Visa Waiver program under an 
amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act (Trump 2017). The scope of the order 
further galvanized links between anti-Islamophobia activism and supporters of the US 
refugee resettlement program. The day after the order was signed, an event that had been 
planned as a workshop about Islamophobia and racism and a networking lunch 
transformed into a standing-room-only rally protesting all aspects of the order. 
For many in the community who had not worked to support refugees in the past, 
this was a highly embarrassing and mobilizing moment. Muslim refugees had slowly 
become more and more visible as members of Louisville’s Muslim community and it was 
becoming clearer and clearer that, with the exception of the mostly Arab and Turkish 
groups helping the Syrians since 2014, Muslims had taken little collective action to help 
these refugees. With Muslim refugees as a category now a serious political issue linked to 
Islamophobic rhetoric and what many saw as the first step toward a full-scale Muslim ban 
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or Muslim internment, this seemed to be an shameful mark on their record as a 
community. Individuals who had been previously reticent to participate scrambled to 
donate and hold public events to demonstrate their support for the Syrian community. At 
times, these attempts have not been well-received, revealing persistent tensions between 
Muslim community groups. For example, a Somali community leader visited a popular 
Somali grocery store to set up a donation box for Syrian refugees on behalf of a primarily 
South Asian philanthropic group. A man in the store asked him why he should donate to 
the Syrians while Somalis are dying of famine. Should we not, he reasoned, take care of 
our own first? The community leader argued that Syrians are fellow Muslims and 
neighbors and that the community should support both causes. Yet it is hard not to 
sympathize with this challenge considering how infrequently wealthy community 
members have helped struggling Somalis since they started to arrive in the late 1990s. 
Muslims in Louisville have not yet come to terms with this history, but, with recent 
events, there is hope for solidarities across class, race, and ethnic divisions based on 
shared political concerns. 
Finally, recent efforts to support refugee resettlement are linked to projects aimed 
at making mosques and Islamic centers more “open” and thus more modern. 
Conversations about openness can have a multiplicity of meanings in the local context, 
but usually refer to outreach efforts aimed at creating interfaith alliances and engaging 
with the local community. They may also refer to reforms aimed at changing mosques 
and Islamic centers to fit the American context. These include internal debates over how 
the roles of these gathering spaces might broaden to encompass things like charity and 
social functions. As discussed previously, roles for mosques beyond being spaces for 
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worship can be controversial within Muslim communities, but this expansion is becoming 
quite common in the US, with mosques and Islamic centers taking cues from American 
churches. This meaning of openness is not unrelated to the more common meaning of 
increasing local engagement. People organizing a mere worship space have little need for 
interfaith cooperation. It is only when Islamic centers and mosques start to fill other 
congregational needs and become sites for building solidarities beyond religious 
observance that connecting to other communities makes sense and internal tensions rise 
to the fore. 
The physical space of the mosque is the battleground for those who disagree over 
changes to mosque organization. What should happen in the mosque? How should 
resources in the mosque be used? When collecting donations for the Syrian refugees, 
volunteers often had to persuade mosque boards to give them access to storage space. 
Space and resources in the mosque could also be a point of contention when holding 
events. At one event, an argument ensued after organizers used tables from a room where 
Qur’an lessons were taking place and they had to move some back and make do with less 
table space. Some mosque boards, made up of mostly older and more conservative 
members, prioritize highly faith-permeated activities like religious education and da’wa 
(missionary work) over interfaith engagement or charitable efforts. The most active 
volunteers, on the other hand, are not shy about expressing their admiration for the large 
number of social services that churches provide in the US, describing their amazement at 
the size and features of some church buildings. Mosque members disagree over whether 
service expansion is an appropriate adaptation to the American context or an 
inappropriate and unnecessary innovation. 
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Reaching beyond the congregation was a profound change of direction for some 
Islamic centers in post-September 11th Louisville, as many Muslim groups had drawn 
inward so as to remain inconspicuous and safe in response to growing Islamophobia. One 
long-time KRM employee said that, when the Kosovars arrived, there were some efforts 
to get Islamic centers involved that seemed to be off to a good start, but after the 
September 11th terror attacks in 2001, refugee arrivals decreased significantly and 
Muslim communities put refugee issues “on the back burner.” Turkish community 
members related at length their recent efforts to actively connect with more ethnic and 
religious groups, which started with their decision to connect with the Syrians. They were 
very happy with how successful their outreach efforts have been and how much support 
they have received in the recent US political climate, but they stress how much of a risk 
they felt they were taking initially: 
When I first came to the United States my fellow Turks told me don't go other 
nations’ mosques or anything because they were scared. They said we don't want 
to be close to potential terrorists, we don't know other people, you know? We 
don't want to be like seen in pictures like this was a concern. 
 
This risk, multiple individuals stressed, was not just an individual issue, but a concern for 
the national Gülenist group of which they were a part. What might happen to the 
organization if a member was associated with a terror suspect? The most active Turkish 
volunteers are still very uncomfortable with individuals and groups that follow more 
conservative schools of Islam, people who they describe as less open with the 
connotation of being less willing to change in a Western context. For example, a group of 
Somalis invited to a Turkish Thanksgiving celebration complained that the holiday is un-
Islamic, which made the Turks uncomfortable with and suspicious of them. 
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 Charitable work is part of a larger assemblage of public outreach activities in 
which local mosques and Islamic centers are engaging, including open mosque days and 
speaking engagements sponsored by the numerous interfaith nonprofits in Louisville. It is 
no accident that those individuals who are most engaged in charitable activities for 
refugees and other needy people living in Louisville are also the people who are regular 
attendees and organizers at various interfaith gatherings. While refugee resettlement is 
not inherently an interfaith activity, it has become understood as such. In part, this is 
because almost all outreach activities initiated by Muslim communities in Louisville are 
interfaith since Muslims are in the minority. In addition, this can be attributed to the 
names and affiliations of the two resettlement agencies in Louisville, Catholic Charities, 
which is an affiliate of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB), and 
Kentucky Refugee Ministries, an affiliate of Church World Services (CWS) and 
Episcopal Migration Ministries (EMM). What these names and affiliations mean can be 
incredibly confusing. Are the resettlement agencies part of the government? Are they part 
of a church? Most of the resettlement agency staff members are American non-Muslims, 
but there are some staff members who are definitely not Christian and there is no 
religious programming. A Muslim staff member explained how challenging it can be just 
to translate the name “Kentucky Refugee Ministries” without using a word that implies a 
stronger religious affiliation than is actually present. It is no surprise then that working 
with the resettlement agencies is often lumped into the category of interfaith activities. 
Beyond their direct interactions with resettlement agencies, Muslim groups have 
enhanced other interfaith aspects of the refugee resettlement program. Promoting 
intercultural and interfaith exchange is a key strength of the co-sponsorship program, but 
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cordial relationships that Muslim communities developed with church co-sponsorship 
teams that they assisted added another layer of community cooperation. These 
modifications to the traditional co-sponsorship program model fit neatly into larger 
Muslim community efforts to become open. 
Muslim charitable activity centered on Syrian refugees in Louisville is grounded 
in complex and multifaceted motivations, some of which are more overt than others. 
Charitable giving to the less fortunate in God’s name is a key requirement of Muslim 
religious practice, but this is far from the only reason why Muslims in Louisville feel a 
particularly strong call to help Syrian refugees. Many Muslim volunteers, especially 
immigrant volunteers from the Middle East, act on a sense of national obligation based 
on social and political ties with Syrian refugees. Some feel the need to support those who 
are, like them, part of the Muslim religious minority in the US and thus are targets of 
anti-Muslim discrimination. There is also a popular feeling that Muslims and Middle 
Easterners will be judged based on the behavior of these new arrivals and so it is in the 
interest of wealthy, educated immigrant families to “lift up” the poor, uneducated new 
Syrians. Many of these motivations are based on or strengthen new modes of belonging 
around which Louisvillians are now mobilizing. 
This aid work has profoundly shifted the contours of Muslim community groups. 
For immigrants from Middle Eastern countries, giving and sharing resources reinforces 
transnational political ties and national community. The Syrian community in particular 
is quickly becoming a diaspora that encompasses multiple ethnicities and classes. Syrian 
immigrant professionals have attempted to use their aid as a tool to make Syrian refugees 
match their aspirations for a Syrian national image. US political debates about the safety 
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of the refugee program have changed the ways that both non-Muslims and Muslims 
perceive the boundaries of their communities. Refugee resettlement, once a fringe issue 
for anti-Islamophobia activists in Louisville, is now a core concern and Muslim refugees 
are a symbolically important part of the Muslim-American community in the political 
sphere. 
At all of these scales, volunteer work has been key to how mosque members 
define their place in society in relation to other Muslims and non-Muslims. In his early 
19th century description of the qualities of American democratic society, Alexis de 
Tocqueville was so impressed by the novel American love of voluntary associations that 
he wrote, “Nothing, in my opinion, is more deserving of our attention than the intellectual 
and moral associations of America,” (2002[1835], 585). In his opinion, these associations 
were a model example of American civil society. It is appropriate, then that voluntary 
engagement is such a defining feature of American Muslim community creation. 
Volunteer groups are key forms of political and social engagement that, if they continue, 






 Aya’s brow furrowed slightly and she spoke cautiously, “You should know when 
you meet Hanan, she’s legally blind, ok? I’ll call her and tell her about you.” If Aya 
hadn’t told me, I’m not sure I would have noticed. Hanan walks at a normal pace without 
a cane and her eyes aren’t visibly damaged. When she got in my car to drive to the coffee 
shop, a welcome excursion while the children were at school, it took me a minute to 
understand why she was struggling with the seat belt. Her confidence had made me forget 
already. It had been nearly six months since Hanan’s family arrived in Louisville and I 
was far from the first stranger to call, then show up on her doorstep. First came the 
caseworkers driving them here and there to countless appointments and showing them the 
bus routes. Then came a group of Arab ladies from the mosque with dishes, forks, knives, 
spoons, and meat. Hanan came to rely on these ladies in the coming months to transport 
her to the grocery store or to the laundromat; she can’t distinguish colors and shapes well, 
so it’s hard to memorize bus routes on unfamiliar streets. She and her husband had 
managed to put together enough money to buy a van and soon she wouldn’t need quite so 
many rides. Her new concern was summer clothing for her children. I suggested that she 
might ask the people from the mosque, since I knew that they had bags and bags of 
clothing gathered as donations. She shook her head. No. I can’t ask for this. They’re my 
friends; I can’t ask for too much like this. As I drop her off at home, her children have 
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just gotten off the bus and they stop to say hello. Oh, another stranger driving our mother 
around. 
 The resettlement process requires a great deal of blind faith. Get on this plane. It 
will take you to a city you have never heard of far from all your friends and family. When 
you get there, strangers might be there to meet you. They will help you get food and 
shelter. Later, they will come to your home and take you to appointments and English 
lessons. Please trust them. After a week or so, you will be taking the bus on your own on 
these streets that you do not recognize. Welcome to the United States! When KRM was 
staffed by three very committed women, staff did not stay strangers for long, but things 
have changed. Forging any sort of personal connection with every staff member involved 
in your case is essentially impossible. The person who is taking you the food stamp office 
might be an intern who you never see again. There may be twenty or more students in 
your English class interacting with one teacher. But what about the women who visit for 
tea every so often? The ones who speak your language and can sit and chat about life. 
When you need help, they treat you like a friend or a family member. Those people stop 
being strangers very quickly. 
 Yet in a sense, while individual Muslim volunteers are more knowable, Muslim 
communities are far less knowable units. One woman coming to your door with a box of 
household supplies represents a massive group of anonymous donors and supporters that 
you may never meet. This network, unlike a resettlement agency with a clear mission 
statement, employees with bounded tasks and duties, and a place in an institutional 
hierarchy, is a loosely organized grouping of people with varying, overlapping 
motivations, a lack of clearly articulated goals, and no real name to identify them. 
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Repeatedly throughout my fieldwork, I asked who was helping the refugees and received 
vague responses, like “the Muslim community” or “some Turkish people” or “some Arab 
people”. Simply understanding what community KRM had engaged with as part of the 
IRUSA grant became central to my analysis. Who were these people? Why did they 
help? 
These complex questions are key to the puzzle of Muslim community engagement 
in Louisville, but even those individuals who feel that they are part of the Muslim 
community have trouble defining what that is and what it means. Often, “Muslim 
community” just means the Muslims who are most like the person who uses the phrase in 
terms of class, ethnicity, or nationality. At other times, volunteers are invoking 
solidarities across these barriers that are most powerful in the context of charitable work. 
These definitions may at times have more to do with aspirations for community than the 
actual reality of the moment. 
It is notable that people rarely talked about Muslim community outside of the 
context of coming together to do good works, whether that happened during Ramadan, in 
response to an emergency, or as part of welcoming a new refugee family. Community is 
constituted through material and social aid and the networks they flow through. Even 
fundraising and community outreach events often play the additional role of bringing 
community members, including refugees, together. As Liisa Malkki writes, “The 
benefactor’s own need to help those in need may generate actions that in fact help the 
benefactor him/herself in surprising and vital ways,” (2015, 8). While both KRM staff 
and Muslim volunteers are driven by a “need to help,” these needs are constituted in 
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profoundly different ways and the obligations that go along with these needs are 
understood differently. 
This study suggests that Muslim FBOs have a significant impact on integration, 
but not exactly in the way that one might expect based on previous research. Community 
engagement through support of refugee resettlement, based on this data, promotes 
integration for both the helpers and the people who are being helped. This charitable 
work has encouraged several local Muslim groups to work together in ways that they 
never have before. Relative to this, refugee integration into the social fabric of the 
wealthier mosques has been minimal. Refugees have become incorporated into national 
and ethnic communities through occasional social gatherings and resources like the 
Syrian Whatsapp chat group, but they are still absent from East End congregations 
because of a lack of proximity. Despite the connections that refugee aid has forged, class 
continues to be a significant barrier to community unity. 
In addition, significant ethnic divides persist. However, the Muslim volunteer 
groups that were most involved in the Syrian resettlement are now attempting to create 
stronger relationships with other refugee groups like the Somalis and are planning a 
fundraising and community outreach event, a multicultural market, to which all refugee 
groups will be invited. Is this too little too late? There seems to be a theme in local 
organizing of “we will try it with the Syrians first, then with everyone else”, rooted in the 
novelty of Muslim organizing around refugee issues. Some see this as Arab-centric 
thinking. Time will tell if community members can come to terms with their historic lack 
of engagement and work beyond these tensions. 
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Data from this study suggests that, although Muslim FBOs in Louisville do 
adhere to different ethical standards from resettlement agencies and their motivations are 
far from neutral, there is no evidence that this leads to proselytizing or other types of 
coercion. Evidence does seem to indicate that some refugees prefer working with Muslim 
community members, with whom they develop closer relationships. It is also clear that 
they have connections that allow for better access to funding and other material 
resources. Also, although there has been some tension with local resettlement agencies, 
Muslim volunteers have developed resources and opportunities that do not necessarily 
conflict with those that KRM provides. Their methods would not be an effective 
replacement for professional resettlement services, but they provide effective 
supplementary services. 
If KRM is to make these benefits more accessible, the agency must continue to 
actively develop a relationship with local Muslim groups. In order for future outreach to 
be effective, it will be necessary to pay close attention to the differences between the 
discourses they use and the goals that they set and those of community groups. When 
training Muslim co-sponsors or collaborating with Muslim FBOs, KRM staff should keep 
in mind that Muslim immigrant professionals often enter their interactions with 
resettlement agencies with many assumptions about what integration and their 
relationship with Muslim refugees will look like. Educational outreach is particularly 
important in this community to clarify the place of the resettlement agency in the refugee 
resettlement process. This could take the form of donor information meetings, possibly 
taking place both at KRM’s offices and in meeting spaces at mosques, Islamic centers, 
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and/or cultural centers. It would also be helpful to prepare clear written materials on 
KRM’s responsibilities to be supplied to prospective co-sponsors, volunteers, and donors. 
In the future, KRM should also consider setting more programmatic goals beyond 
those required by funding sources. This would ideally involve a broad community 
consultation process that would include the emerging Muslim voluntary organizations 
among other local stakeholders. Refugee resettlement agencies like KRM would do well 
to listen to critiques that they receive from community groups, as alternative perspectives 
may highlight serious problems that need to be addressed. For example, the substandard 
housing conditions in Jefferson County have become so common and every day for most 
staff members that they no longer give them much thought. Complaints from clients and 
volunteers should be a reminder that this form of everyday structural violence is not 
acceptable and requires some form of action. KRM already holds community 
consultation meetings, but their role could be broadened and their frequency could be 
increased. 
KRM and Muslim FBOs need to establish better communication practices to 
facilitate refugee access to new Muslim social services. Although these groups have so 
far served mostly Muslim populations, the same groups that encouraged them to get more 
involved, all said that they would be willing to help others if they knew how to contact 
them. When a refugee client needs financial assistance or donated items, it would be 
helpful if either KRM or the refugee could request help directly. Many churches have 
clothes closets, food banks, or English classes that clients already receive information 
about. Having regular enough services to clearly advertise and invite refugees and other 
needy people to receive direct aid would require a bit more organization on the part of 
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Muslim groups, but there are some promising initiatives already starting. One mosque 
already has a clothes closet that is open once every two weeks, but, so far, the organizers 
have not made flyers or communicated the opening times clearly to KRM staff. Better 
communication could mean that independent Muslim charitable initiatives could reach a 
larger audience. 
 With the future of the refugee resettlement program in question and refugee 
arrivals currently suspended, now may not seem like the best time to pour more resources 
into donor and co-sponsor outreach. Free-cases (cases without family ties) are the cases 
that generally receive support from co-sponsors and none will arrive for four months 
under the current Supreme Court decision relating to Executive Orders 13769 and 13780. 
Yet in the wake of this reduction in arrivals and in anticipation of proposed budget cuts 
both to the programs that resettle refugees and the programs that support low-income 
residents of the US with and without refugee status, more non-governmental assistance 
will be vital to sustain important support services. Muslims are likely to be sympathetic 
to the hardships caused by the executive orders that they refer to as the Muslim Ban. 
Mobilizing FBO support for refugee resettlement may be the way for resettlement 
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Schedule for Kentucky Refugee Ministries Employees 
1) Tell me about your involvement with refugee resettlement agencies. 
a) When did you first become involved with a refugee resettlement agency? 
b) In what capacity were you involved? 
c) Has your role changed since then? If so, how? 
d) How has the agency changed since you first became involved? 
2) In your experience, what services, if any, do local Muslims provide for refugees? 
a) When did you first hear about these services? 
b) Are these services effective? Why or why not? 
c) How do these services compare to those provided by KRM and KOR? 
d) How could these services better complement KRM’s services? 
e) How could KRM’s services better complement these community-provided 
services? 
3) What do you think about local mosques and Islamic centers? 
a) Do you trust them? Why or why not? 
b) What do mosques and Islamic centers do well? 
c) What do mosques and Islamic centers do poorly? 
4) Tell me about partnerships with the Muslim community.
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a) What is the relationship between KRM and local mosques and Islamic centers 
like? 
b) How has this relationship changed over time? 
c) What challenges has the partnership faced? 
d) Is this partnership effective? How so? 
e) What part of this partnership are you most proud of? 
f) What do you think could be improved about the partnership? 
5) What if anything have I not asked that you think is important to my project? 
6) Would you be willing to participate in an additional interview in the future? 
Schedule for Volunteers 
1) In what religious organizations are you currently active? How long have you been 
involved? 
2) Are many members of [religious organization] refugees or immigrants? 
a) If so, when did they arrive in the US? What agency helped them during 
resettlement? 
3) How do you feel about helping refugees? 
a) Why do you help refugees? 
4) Tell me about [religious organization]’s work with refugees. 
a) When did [religious organization] start working with refugees? 
b) To what needs did [religious organization] respond? How did [religious 
organization] respond? 
c) What challenges has this work faced? 
d) What part of this response are you most proud of? 
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e) Was this response effective? How so? 
f) How have [religious organization]’s responses changed over time? 
g) What do you think could be improved about [religious organization]’s response? 
5) Have you ever officially partnered with a refugee resettlement agency? If so… 
a) When did you first become involved with a refugee resettlement agency? 
b) In what capacity were you involved? 
c) Has your role changed since then? If so, how? 
6) What do you think about local refugee resettlement agencies? 
a) Do you trust them? Why or why not? 
b) What do local agencies do well? 
c) What do local agencies do poorly? 
7) What do you think about the US refugee program as a whole? 
a) Do you trust the people who administer the US refugee program nationally? Why 
or why not? 
b) What does the national program do well? 
c) What does the national program do poorly? 
8) Is [religious organization] currently partnering with Kentucky Refugee Ministries or 
Catholic Charities? If not, why? If so, tell me about the partnership. 
a) What work are you doing together? 
b) When did [religious organization] start working with [resettlement agency]? 
c) How has their relationship changed over time? 
d) What challenges has this partnership faced? 
e) Is this partnership effective? How so? 
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f) What part of this partnership are you most proud of? 
g) What do you think could be improved about the partnership? 
9) What if anything have I not asked that you think is important to my project? 
10) Would you be willing to participate in an additional interview in the future? 
Schedule for Refugee Beneficiaries 
1) Tell me about when you first arrived in Louisville. 
a) When did you come to Louisville? 
b) What agency took your case? 
c) What was your favorite thing about Louisville when you first arrived? 
d) What was the most challenging part of your first year in Louisville? 
2) Tell me about the people who helped you when you arrived in Louisville. 
a) Who did you turn to when you needed help? 
b) What did you need? 
c) How did you hear about these people or organizations? 
d) How did these people or organizations help? Did they provide what you needed? 
If not, why? 
3) What do you think about local refugee resettlement agencies? 
a) Do you trust them? Why or why not? 
b) What do local agencies do well? 
c) What do local agencies do poorly? 
4) What do you think about the US refugee program as a whole? 
a) Do you trust the people who administer the US refugee program nationally? Why 
or why not? 
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b) What does the national program do well? 
c) What does the national program do poorly? 
5) What do you think about local mosques and Islamic centers? 
a) Do you trust them? Why or why not? 
b) What do mosques and Islamic centers do well? 
c) What do mosques and Islamic centers do poorly? 
6) From what Muslim organizations have you received benefits? 
a) How did you hear about [religious organization]? 
b) Tell me about the first time you received or requested their help. 
i) What did they provide? Was it what you needed? If not, why? 
ii) How did you feel about asking for help? 
7) In what religious organizations, if any, have you been involved? 
a) Are you still involved? If so, what is your role? 
b) Why did you choose [religious organization] over other options? 
c) Is [religious organization] important to you? Why or why not? 
8) What if anything have I not asked that you think is important to my project? 
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